### 1NC T

#### “Toward” means in the direction of

Taylor 6 – CJ Taylor, Supreme Court Justice on the Supreme Court of Michigan, “Supreme Court of Michigan. Grievance Administrator, Petitioner-Appellant, v. Geoffrey N. Fieger, Respondent-Appellee”, 7-31, http://faculty.law.wayne.edu/henning/ProfResp/Grievance%20Administrator%20v%20Fieger.pdf

MRPC 3.5(c) provides that a lawyer shall not "engage in undignified or discourteous conduct toward the tribunal." (Emphasis added.) We note that the rule does not provide a definition of the word "toward." It is well established that if a term in a court rule is not defined, we interpret the term in accordance with its everyday, plain meaning. Random House Webster's College Dictionary (1997) lists several definitions of the preposition "toward," including "in the direction of" and "with respect to; as regards."

#### Violation: Plan fiats joint cooperation with Mexico, not toward

**Vote neg:**

1. **Limits – key to check conditional affs -- alt is every existing aff multiplied by fiating say yes**
2. **Ground – our interp key to “say no” arguments and DA’s based off of talks –**

### 1NC DA

#### Farm bill passage likely – vote next week

SDL, Stuttgart Daily Leader, 1-20-2014 http://www.stuttgartdailyleader.com/article/20140120/NEWS/140129967

The outlook for completion of the new Farm Bill turned increasingly positive last week as one of the last major areas of disagreement — dairy policy — was being addressed. As of today, it appears House Speaker John Boehner (R-Ohio) and Agriculture Committee Ranking Member Collin Peterson (D-Minn.) are nearing a compromise on a new dairy policy. ¶ If this compromise holds, it should pave the way for the remaining issues to be resolved, final bill language drafted, budget scores obtained, and all the finishing touches put on the Farm Bill over the next week, while Congress is in recess. This should position the Agriculture Committee leadership to bring the Farm Bill conference report to the House and Senate floor for approval the week of Jan. 27. ¶ On the issue of payment limits and "actively engaged", House Agriculture Committee Chairman Frank Lucas (R-Okla.) and Senate Agriculture Committee Ranking Member Thad Cochran (R-Miss.) are working tirelessly to ensure these provisions are workable for all family farms in all regions. They seem to be making great progress in this area on reaching compromises that will not unfairly discriminate against farms due to the crops they grow, the size of the farm, or the family members that are involved in the farm.¶ "Due to the progress made this week, we are increasingly optimistic that a workable and effective Farm Bill for the rice industry will be approved by Congress in the very near future," said Reece Langley, USA Rice's vice president for government affairs. "Passage of this bill will finally help bring some certainty to producers, their lenders, and other industry members."

#### Economic engagement with Mexico is politically divisive

Wilson 13 – Associate at the Mexico Institute of the Woodrow Wilson International. Center for Scholars (Christopher E., January, “A U.S.-Mexico Economic Alliance: Policy Options for a Competitive Region,” http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/new\_ideas\_us\_mexico\_relations.pdf)

At a time when Mexico is poised to experience robust economic growth, a manufacturing renaissance is underway in North America and bilateral trade is booming, the United States and Mexico have an important choice to make: sit back and reap the moderate and perhaps temporal benefits coming naturally from the evolving global context , or implement a robust agenda to improve the competitiveness of North America for the long term . Given that job creation and economic growth in both the United States and Mexico are at stake, t he choice should be simple, but a limited understanding about the magnitude, nature and depth of the U.S.-Mexico economic relationship among the public and many policymakers has made serious action to support regional exporters more politically divisive than it ought to be.

#### GOP leadership will push off Farm Bill if the plan causes controversy- can’t muster political will on tough votes back to back

Jake Sherman covers Congress for POLITICO. He got his start in journalism in high school at The Stamford Advocate, where he became a pro at taking box scores for the sports section. He majored in journalism at George Washington University in D.C. but more accurately got a degree at The GW Hatchet, where he was the men’s basketball beat writer before becoming sports editor and, subsequently, editor-in-chief.¶ During summers, Jake interned at The Journal News (N.Y.) and in the Washington bureaus of the Minneapolis Star Tribune and Newsweek. After finishing a master’s in journalism at Columbia University, Jake became an intern in the D.C. bureau of The Wall Street Journal and Carrie Budoff Brown started in journalism at the York Daily Record in the summer before her freshman year in college. She worked as an editor at The Daily Targum, the student-run newspaper of Rutgers University, and interned at the Richmond Times Dispatch and the New York Times. She worked as a staff writer at the Hartford Courant and the Philadelphia Inquirer before arriving at POLITICO on the day it launched in 2007.¶ Budoff Brown is now a White House reporter who focuses on the intersection of policy and politics in the administration and on Capitol Hill. She has covered the Senate, the 2008 Obama campaign, the health care overhaul bill, Wall Street reform and various tax cut battles in Congress. Politico, 8-28-2013 <http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/immigration-reform-95980.html#ixzz2dIFeo4Sb>

Immigration reform advocates have a new enemy: the congressional calendar.¶ Fall’s fiscal fights have lined up in a way that could delay immigration reform until 2014, multiple senior House Republican leadership aides tell POLITICO, imperiling the effort’s prospects before the midterm elections.¶ The mid-October debt ceiling deadline — an earlier-than-expected target laid out Monday by Treasury Secretary Jack Lew — is changing the House GOP leadership’s plans to pass immigration bills that month.¶ “If we have to deal with the debt limit earlier, it doesn’t change the overall dynamics of the debate, but — just in terms of timing — it might make it harder to find time for immigration bills in October,” one House Republican leadership aide said.¶ That’s not the only scheduling challenge. There are fewer than 40 congressional working days until the end of 2013 — the unofficial deadline for passing immigration reform — and they’ll present some of the most politically challenging votes for lawmakers on both sides of the aisle. It will be difficult to add immigration reform to the list, senior aides say.¶ Government funding runs dry on Sept. 30. The nine days the House is in session that month will be crowded with the debate over the continuing resolution to keep the government operating. The GOP leadership will have to reconcile the screams from conservatives who want to use the bill to defund Obamacare with their own desire to avoid a government shutdown. Of course, anything the House approves would need to pass the Democratic-controlled Senate, which will ignore attempts to weaken the law.¶ Immigration reform isn’t certain to die if it slips into 2014, some in GOP leadership say. But major progress must be made in 2013 as it would be too difficult for the House to chart a course in 2014, an election year.¶ At a fundraiser in Idaho on Monday, Speaker John Boehner predicted a “whale of a fight” over the debt ceiling. That skirmish will surface in October. The House is in session for 14 days during that month, but there is certain to be a good deal of debate over passing a bill that would extend the nation’s borrowing authority.¶ GOP leadership is mulling its initial negotiating position, which is sure to include some changes to entitlements, energy policy and the health care law. Boehner’s leadership team also seems open to discussing ways to soften the blow of the sequester in October, which would add yet another explosive issue to the mix.¶ The White House refuses to negotiate with Republicans over the debt limit, leaving little clarity on how the standoff gets resolved — and when.¶ “Congress has already authorized funding, committed us to make expenditures,” Lew told CNBC Tuesday. “We’re now in the place where the only question is will we pay the bills that the United States has incurred. The only way to do that is for Congress to act — for it to act quickly.”¶ A senior administration official said Tuesday that the increasingly crowded fall calendar was why Obama pressed the House to deal with immigration before the August recess. But the Republican leaders need to make time for it, the official said, and they should want to do it sooner rather than later because the pressure from the president and others isn’t going to let up.¶ But the scarce legislative days and the fiscal battles will be welcome to some House Republicans squeamish about voting on immigration reform. There is little support for passing the kind of comprehensive bill approved by the Senate. But even the piecemeal approach being pushed by the House leadership has its fair share of skeptics in the GOP conference.¶ November could provide a window for immigration reform — but two dynamics may interfere.¶ The debt-ceiling deadline could slip to November if tax receipts come in stronger than expected. If Congress votes on the debt ceiling during the eight-day November session, the Republican leadership is skeptical that it would be easy to turn around and vote on even a pared-back version of immigration reform.¶ The will just won’t be there, some aides say. A similar situation played out earlier this year, when Boehner delayed in January a vote on Hurricane Sandy relief because it came too soon after the tough vote when Congress raised taxes to resolve the fiscal cliff.¶ December will likely bring another government funding debate. The current plan for September is to pass a continuing resolution that lasts until Dec. 15, setting up another year-end spending fight. The House is scheduled to be in session for just eight days in December before leaving for the holidays.¶ Frank Sharry, executive director of America’s Voice, said the new debt limit deadline “is likely to push consideration of immigration to the latter part of October at the earliest.”¶ But Sharry and Angela Kelley, vice president for immigration policy at the Center for American Progress, said the House won’t be able to use the fiscal fights as an excuse.¶ “There are some in leadership who are going to look for any reason not to act,” Kelley said. “There will be a space where this issue is going to have to move. It’s not going to go away because other matters.”

#### Farm Bill key to stable food prices and farm conservation

John Schlageck, Winfield Courier, 11-14-2013 http://www.winfieldcourier.com/agriculture/article\_20ed67fc-4cc5-11e3-89b4-0019bb2963f4.html

To say the farm bill has moved like molasses through Congress the past three years is a gross understatement. This branch of our federal government continues to be mired in the mud of partisan politics.¶ Congress seems hell-bent on infighting while this nation’s business is left undone. Kansans and other farm-state lawmakers are urging their colleagues to look back to more bipartisan times and do something Congress hasn’t done much of lately – pass a major piece of legislation.¶ Remember the old axiom: politics is the art of compromise?¶ Farm country needs a farm bill and we could have used it yesterday. Much of the fall corn, beans and milo are out of the fields and farmers are ready to look toward 2014 and next year’s crops.¶ Kansas farmers and ranchers need the certainty of a completed farm bill in order to make business decisions for next year, says Kansas Farm Bureau President Steve Baccus, an Ottawa County farmer.¶ A strong, affordable crop insurance safety net will help producers develop individual risk management plans, he adds. Reauthorizing livestock disaster programs will protect Kansas ranchers from catastrophic losses such as those suffered by South Dakota ranchers after the recent blizzard.¶ Baccus urged Congress to fund all titles in the new farm bill to avoid abandoning important conservation, research and trade programs to the mercy of the appropriations process. He also called on lawmakers to preserve traditional rural-urban cooperation on nutrition issues.¶ “A farm bill without a meaningful nutrition title will make it difficult, if not impossible, for the House and Senate to reach agreement on a bill that can be signed by the president,” Baccus said. “Congress must pass a unified farm bill that continues the partnership between the nutrition and farm communities and their constituents.”¶ Seems the main challenge in arriving at a new farm bill is the differences on food stamps, officially called the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP).¶ The House has passed legislation to slash approximately $40 billion annually, or about five percent, including changes in eligibility and work requirements. The Senate wants to cut a much smaller $4 billion.¶ SNAP funding has more than doubled during the past five years as the nation’s economy struggled. Democrats contend it is working as intended, providing food to those in need when times are tough. Republicans believe it should be focused on the neediest people.¶ When most Americans think of a farm bill they think of farm subsidies. Few think of all the other things that are covered in this nearly $1 trillion program.¶ Few Americans know that 75 percent of the farm bill is actually helping feed folks who need nutrition assistance. Let me repeat, 75 percent of this bill goes to feed hungry people.¶ Most of the current law’s ag provisions expired in September. Direct payments would have been eliminated and our lawmakers could have taken some of that money applied it to deficit reduction as well as an affordable crop insurance program.¶ If we don’t have a farm bill by 2014 and Congress allows dairy supports to expire, 1930s and 1940s-era farm law would kick in. Some estimates conclude the government will then pay up to four times more for dairy products. If that scenario plays out, many farmers would sell to the government instead of commercial markets, decreasing the commercial supply while raising prices for shoppers at the supermarket

#### Extinction

Brown 9 (Lester R, Founder of the Worldwatch Institute and the Earth Policy Institute “Can Food Shortages Bring Down Civilization?” Scientific American, May, http://www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=civilization-food-shortages)

The biggest threat to global stability is the potential for food crises in poor countries to cause government collapse. Those crises are brought on by ever worsening environmental degradation¶ One of the toughest things for people to do is to anticipate sudden change. Typically we project the future by extrapolating from trends in the past. Much of the time this approach works well. But sometimes it fails spectacularly, and people are simply blindsided by events such as today's economic crisis.¶ For most of us, the idea that civilization itself could disintegrate probably seems preposterous. Who would not find it hard to think seriously about such a complete departure from what we expect of ordinary life? What evidence could make us heed a warning so dire--and how would we go about responding to it? We are so inured to a long list of highly unlikely catastrophes that we are virtually programmed to dismiss them all with a wave of the hand: Sure, our civilization might devolve into chaos--and Earth might collide with an asteroid, too! For many years I have studied global agricultural, population, environmental and economic trends and their interactions. The combined effects of those trends and the political tensions they generate point to the breakdown of governments and societies. Yet I, too, have resisted the idea that food shortages could bring down not only individual governments but also our global civilization.¶ I can no longer ignore that risk. Our continuing failure to deal with the environmental declines that are undermining the world food economy--most important, falling water tables, eroding soils and rising temperatures--forces me to conclude that such a collapse is possible. The Problem of Failed States Even a cursory look at the vital signs of our current world order lends unwelcome support to my conclusion. And those of us in the environmental field are well into our third decade of charting trends of environmental decline without seeing any significant effort to reverse a single one. In six of the past nine years world grain production has fallen short of consumption, forcing a steady drawdown in stocks. When the 2008 harvest began, world carryover stocks of grain (the amount in the bin when the new harvest begins) were at 62 days of consumption, a near record low. In response, world grain prices in the spring and summer of last year climbed to the highest level ever.As demand for food rises faster than supplies are growing, the resulting food-price inflation puts severe stress on the governments of countries already teetering on the edge of chaos. Unable to buy grain or grow their own, hungry people take to the streets. Indeed, even before the steep climb in grain prices in 2008, the number of failing states was expanding [see sidebar at left]. Many of their problem's stem from a failure to slow the growth of their populations. But if the food situation continues to deteriorate, entire nations will break down at an ever increasing rate. We have entered a new era in geopolitics. In the 20th century the main threat to international security was superpower conflict; today it is failing states. It is not the concentration of power but its absence that puts us at risk.States fail when national governments can no longer provide personal security, food security and basic social services such as education and health care. They often lose control of part or all of their territory. When governments lose their monopoly on power, law and order begin to disintegrate. After a point, countries can become so dangerous that food relief workers are no longer safe and their programs are halted; in Somalia and Afghanistan, deteriorating conditions have already put such programs in jeopardy.Failing states are of international concern because they are a source of terrorists, drugs, weapons and refugees, threatening political stability everywhere. Somalia, number one on the 2008 list of failing states, has become a base for piracy. Iraq, number five, is a hotbed for terrorist training. Afghanistan, number seven, is the world's leading supplier of heroin. Following the massive genocide of 1994 in Rwanda, refugees from that troubled state, thousands of armed soldiers among them, helped to destabilize neighboring Democratic Republic of the Congo (number six).Our global civilization depends on a functioning network of politically healthy nation-states to control the spread of infectious disease, to manage the international monetary system, to control international terrorism and to reach scores of other common goals. If the system for controlling infectious diseases--such as polio, SARS or avian flu--breaks down, humanity will be in trouble. Once states fail, no one assumes responsibility for their debt to outside lenders. If enough states disintegrate, their fall will threaten the stability of global civilization itself.

### 1NC K

#### Globalization makes extinction inevitable- social and environmental factors build positive feedbacks create a cascade of destruction

**Ehrenfeld, Rutgers biology professor, 2005**

(David, “The Environmental Limits to Globalization”, Conservation Biology Vol. 19 No. 2, ebsco)

Ehrenfeld ‘5,

The overall environmental changes brought about or accelerated by globalization are, however, much easier to describe for the near future, even if the long-term outcomes are still obscure. Climate will continue to change rapidly (Watson 2002); cheap energy and other resources (Youngquist 1997; Hall et al. 2003; Smil 2003), including fresh water (Aldhous 2003; Gleick 2004), will diminish and disappear at an accelerating rate; agricultural and farm communities will deteriorate further while we lose more genetic diversity among crops and farm animals (Fowler & Mooney 1990; Bailey & Lappé 2002; Wirzba 2003); biodiversity will decline faster as terrestrial and aquatic ecosystems are damaged (Heywood 1995); harmful exotic species will become ever more numerous (Mooney & Hobbs 2000); old and new diseases of plants, animals, and humans will continue to proliferate (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 1995-present; Lashley & Durham 2002); and more of the great ocean fisheries will become economically—and occasionally biologically—extinct (Myers & Worm 2003). Although critics have taken issue with many of these forecasts (Lomborg 2001; Hollander 2003), the critics' arguments seem more political than scientific; the data they muster in support of their claims are riddled with errors, significant omissions, and misunderstandings of environmental processes (Orr 2002). Indeed, these environmental changes are demonstrably and frighteningly real. And because of these and related changes, one social prediction can be made with assurance: globalization is creating an environment that will prove hostile to its own survival. This is not a political statement or a moral judgment. It is not the same as saying that globalization ought to be stopped. The enlightened advocates of globalization claim that globalization could give the poorest residents of the poorest countries a chance to enjoy a decent income. And the enlightened opponents of globalization assert that the damage done by globalization to local communities everywhere, and the increasing gap it causes between the rich and the poor, far outweigh the small amount of good globalization may do. The debate is vitally important, but the fate of globalization is unlikely to be determined by who wins it. Al Gore remarked about the political impasse over global warming and the current rapid melting of the world's glaciers: “Glaciers don't give a damn about politics. They just reflect reality” (Herbert 2004). The same inexorable environmental reality is even now drawing the curtains on globalization. Often minimized in the United States, this reality is already painfully obvious in China, which is experiencing the most rapid expansion related to globalization. Nearly every issue of China Daily, the national English-language newspaper, features articles on the environmental effects of globalization. Will efforts in China to rein in industrial expansion, energy consumption, and environmental pollution succeed (Fu 2004; Qin 2004; Xu 2004)? Will the desperate attempts of Chinese authorities to mitigate the impact of rapid industrialization on the disastrously scarce supplies of fresh water be effective (Li 2004; Liang 2004)? The environmental anxiety is palpable and pervasive. The environmental effects of globalization cannot be measured by simple numbers like the gross domestic product or unemployment rate. But even without such summary statistics, there are so many examples of globalization's impact, some obvious, some less so, that a convincing argument about its effects and trends can be made. Among the environmental impacts of globalization, perhaps the most significant is its fostering of the excessive use of energy, with the attendant consequences. This surge in energy use was inevitable, once the undeveloped four-fifths of the world adopted the energy-wasting industrialization model of the developed fifth, and as goods that once were made locally began to be transported around the world at a tremendous cost of energy. China's booming production, largely the result of its surging global exports, has caused a huge increase in the mining and burning of coal and the building of giant dams for more electric power, an increase of power that in only the first 8 months of 2003 amounted to 16% (Bradsher 2003; Guo 2004). The many environmental effects of the coal burning include, most importantly, global warming. Fossil-fuel-driven climate change seems likely to result in a rise in sea level, massive extinction of species, agricultural losses from regional shifts in temperature and rainfall, and, possibly, alteration of major ocean currents, with secondary climatic change. Other side effects of coal burning are forest decline, especially from increased nitrogen deposition; acidification of freshwater and terrestrial ecosystems from nitrogen and sulfur compounds; and a major impact on human health from polluted air. Dams, China's alternative method of producing electricity without burning fossil fuels, themselves cause massive environmental changes. These changes include fragmentation of river channels; loss of floodplains, riparian zones, and adjacent wetlands; deterioration of irrigated terrestrial environments and their surface waters; deterioration and loss of river deltas and estuaries; aging and reduction of continental freshwater runoff to oceans; changes in nutrient cycling; impacts on biodiversity; methylmercury contamination of food webs; and greenhouse gas emissions from reservoirs. The impoundment of water in reservoirs at high latitudes in the northern hemisphere has even caused a small but measurable increase in the speed of the earth's rotation and a change in the planet's axis (Rosenberg et al. 2000; Vörösmarty & Sahagian 2000). Moreover, the millions of people displaced by reservoirs such as the one behind China's Three Gorges Dam have their own environmental impacts as they struggle to survive in unfamiliar and often unsuitable places. Despite the importance of coal and hydropower in China's booming economy, the major factor that enables globalization to flourish around the world—even in China—is still cheap oil. Cheap oil runs the ships, planes, trucks, cars, tractors, harvesters, earth-moving equipment, and chain saws that globalization needs; cheap oil lifts the giant containers with their global cargos off the container ships onto the waiting flatbeds; cheap oil even mines and processes the coal, grows and distills the biofuels, drills the gas wells, and builds the nuclear power plants while digging and refining the uranium ore that keeps them operating. Paradoxically, the global warming caused by this excessive burning of oil is exerting negative feedback on the search for more oil to replace dwindling supplies. The search for Arctic oil has been slowed by recent changes in the Arctic climate. Arctic tundra has to be frozen and snow-covered to allow the heavy seismic vehicles to prospect for underground oil reserves, or long-lasting damage to the landscape results. The recent Arctic warming trend has reduced the number of days that vehicles can safely explore: from 187 in 1969 to 103 in 2002 (Revkin 2004). Globalization affects so many environmental systems in so many ways that negative interactions of this sort are frequent and usually unpredictable. Looming over the global economy is the imminent disappearance of cheap oil. There is some debate about when global oil production will peak—many of the leading petroleum geologists predict the peak will occur in this decade, possibly in the next two or three years (Campbell 1997; Kerr 1998; Duncan & Youngquist 1999; Holmes & Jones 2003; Appenzeller 2004; ASPO 2004; Bakhtiari 2004; Gerth 2004)—but it is abundantly clear that the remaining untapped reserves and alternatives such as oil shale, tar sands, heavy oil, and biofuels are economically and energetically no substitute for the cheap oil that comes pouring out of the ground in the Arabian Peninsula and a comparatively few other places on Earth (Youngquist 1997). Moreover, the hydrogen economy and other high-tech solutions to the loss of cheap oil are clouded by serious, emerging technological doubts about feasibility and safety, and a realistic fear that, if they can work, they will not arrive in time to rescue our globalized industrial civilization (Grant 2003; Tromp et al. 2003; Romm 2004). Even energy conservation, which we already know how to implement both technologically and as part of an abstemious lifestyle, is likely to be no friend to globalization, because it reduces consumption of all kinds, and consumption is what globalization is all about. In a keynote address to the American Geological Society, a noted expert on electric power networks, Richard Duncan (2001), predicted widespread, permanent electric blackouts by 2012, and the end of industrial, globalized civilization by 2030. The energy crunch is occurring now. According to Duncan, per capita energy production in the world has already peaked—that happened in 1979—and has declined since that date. In a more restrained evaluation of the energy crisis, Charles Hall and colleagues (2003) state that: The world is not about to run out of hydrocarbons, and perhaps it is not going to run out of oil from unconventional sources any time soon. What will be difficult to obtain is cheap petroleum, because what is left is an enormous amount of low-grade hydrocarbons, which are likely to be much more expensive financially, energetically, politically and especially environmentally. Nuclear power still has “important…technological, economic, environmental and public safety problems,” they continue, and at the moment “renewable energies present a mixed bag of opportunities.” Their solution? Forget about the more expensive and dirtier hydrocarbons such as tar sands. We need a major public policy intervention to foster a crash program of public and private investment in research on renewable energy technologies. Perhaps this will happen—necessity does occasionally bring about change. But I do not see renewable energy coming in time or in sufficient magnitude to save globalization. Sunlight, wind, geothermal energy, and biofuels, necessary as they are to develop, cannot replace cheap oil at the current rate of use without disastrous environmental side effects. These renewable alternatives can only power a nonglobalized civilization that consumes less energy (Ehrenfeld 2003b). Already, as the output of the giant Saudi oil reserves has started to fall (Gerth 2004) and extraction of the remaining oil is becoming increasingly costly, oil prices are climbing and the strain is being felt by other energy sources. For example, the production of natural gas, which fuels more than half of U.S. homes, is declining in the United States, Canada, and Mexico as wells are exhausted. In both the United States and Canada, intensive new drilling is being offset by high depletion rates, and gas consumption increases yearly. In 2002 the United States imported 15% of its gas from Canada, more than half of Canada's total gas production. However, with Canada's gas production decreasing and with the “stranded” gas reserves in the United States and Canadian Arctic regions unavailable until pipelines are built 5–10 years from now, the United States is likely to become more dependent on imported liquid natural gas (LNG). Here are some facts to consider. Imports of LNG in the United States increased from 39 billion cubic feet in 1990 to 169 billion cubic feet in 2002, which was still <1% of U.S. natural gas consumption. The largest natural gas field in the world is in the tiny Persian Gulf state of Qatar. Gas is liquefied near the site of production by cooling it to −260°F (−162°C), shipped in special refrigerated trains to waiting LNG ships, and then transported to an LNG terminal, where it is off-loaded, regasified, and piped to consumers. Each LNG transport ship costs a half billion dollars. An LNG terminal costs one billion dollars. There are four LNG terminals in the United States, none in Canada or Mexico. Approximately 30 additional LNG terminal sites to supply the United States are being investigated or planned, including several in the Bahamas, with pipelines to Florida. On 19 January 2004, the LNG terminal at Skikda, Algeria, blew up with tremendous force, flattening much of the port and killing 30 people. The Skikda terminal, renovated by Halliburton in the late 1990s, will cost $800 million to $1 billion to replace. All major ports in the United States are heavily populated, and there is strong environmental opposition to putting terminals at some sites in the United States. Draw your own conclusions about LNG as a source of cheap energy (Youngquist & Duncan 2003; Romero 2004). From LNG to coal gasification to oil shale to nuclear fission to breeder reactors to fusion to renewable energy, even to improvements in efficiency of energy use (Browne 2004), our society looks from panacea to panacea to feed the ever-increasing demands of globalization. But no one solution or combination of solutions will suffice to meet this kind of consumption. In the words of Vaclav Smil (2003): Perhaps the evolutionary imperative of our species is to ascend a ladder of ever-increasing energy throughputs, never to consider seriously any voluntary consumption limits and stay on this irrational course until it will be too late to salvage the irreplaceable underpinnings of biospheric services that will be degraded and destroyed by our progressing use of energy and materials. Among the many other environmental effects of globalization, one that is both obvious and critically important is reduced genetic and cultural diversity in agriculture. As the representatives of the petrochemical and pharmaceutical industries' many subsidiary seed corporations sell their patented seeds in more areas previously isolated from global trade, farmers are dropping their traditional crop varieties, the reservoir of our accumulated genetic agricultural wealth, in favor of a few, supposedly high-yielding, often chemical-dependent seeds. The Indian agricultural scientist H. Sudarshan (2002) has provided a typical example. He noted that Over the last half century, India has probably grown over 30,000 different, indigenous varieties or landraces of rice. This situation has, in the last 20 years, changed drastically and it is predicted that in another 20 years, rice diversity will be reduced to 50 varieties, with the top 10 accounting for over three-quarters of the sub-continent's rice acreage. With so few varieties left, where will conventional plant breeders and genetic engineers find the genes for disease and pest resistance, environmental adaptations, and plant quality and vigor that we will surely need? A similar loss has been seen in varieties of domestic animals. Of the 3831 breeds of ass, water buffalo, cattle, goat, horse, pig, and sheep recorded in the twentieth century, at least 618 had become extinct by the century's end, and 475 of the remainder were rare. Significantly, the countries with the highest ratios of surviving breeds per million people are those that are most peripheral and remote from global commerce (Hall & Ruane 1993). Unfortunately, with globalization, remoteness is no longer tenable. Here is a poignant illustration. Rural Haitians have traditionally raised a morphotype of long-snouted, small black pig known as the Creole pig. Adapted to the Haitian climate, Creole pigs had very low maintenance requirements, and were mainstays of soil fertility and the rural economy. In 1982 and 1983, most of these pigs were deliberately killed as part of swine disease control efforts required to integrate Haiti into the hemispheric economy. They were replaced by pigs from Iowa that needed clean drinking water, roofed pigpens, and expensive, imported feed. The substitution was a disaster. Haitian peasants, the hemisphere's poorest, lost an estimated $600 million. Haiti's ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide (2000), who, whatever his faults, understood the environmental and social effects of globalization, wrote There was a 30% drop in enrollment in rural schools… a dramatic decline in the protein consumption in rural Haiti, a devastating decapitalization of the peasant economy and an incalculable negative impact on Haiti's soil and agricultural productivity. The Haitian peasantry has not recovered to this day…. For many peasants the extermination of the Creole pigs was their first experience of globalization. The sale of Mexican string beans and South African apples in Michigan and Minnesota in January is not without consequences. The globalization of food has led to the introduction of “high-input” agricultural methods in many less-developed countries, with sharply increasing use of fertilizers, insecticides, herbicides, fungicides, irrigation pumps, mechanical equipment, and energy. There has been a correspondingly sharp decline in farmland biodiversity—including birds, invertebrates, and wild crop relatives—much of which is critically important to agriculture through ecosystem services or as reservoirs of useful genes (Benton et al. 2003). The combination of heavy fertilizer use along with excessive irrigation has resulted in toxic accumulations of salt, nitrates, and pesticides ruining soils all over the world, along with the dangerous drawdown and contamination of underground reserves of fresh water (Hillel 1991; Kaiser 2004; Sugden et al. 2004). Although population growth has been responsible for some of this agricultural intensification, much has been catalyzed by globalization (Wright 1990). Aquaculture is another agriculture-related activity. Fish and shellfish farming—much of it for export—has more than doubled in the past 15 years. This industry's tremendous requirements for fish meal and fish oil to use as food and its degradation of coastal areas are placing a great strain on marine ecosystems (Naylor et al. 2000). Other unanticipated problems are occurring. For instance, the Scottish fisheries biologist Alexander Murray and his colleagues (2002) report that infectious salmon anemia … is caused by novel virulent strains of a virus that has adapted to intensive aquacultural practices and has exploited the associated [ship] traffic to spread both locally and internationally…. Extensive ship traffic and lack of regulation increase the risk of spreading disease to animals raised for aquaculture and to other animals in marine environments…. [and underscore] the potential role of shipping in the global transport of zoonotic pathogens. The reduction of diversity in agriculture is paralleled by a loss and reshuffling of wild species. The global die-off of species now occurring, unprecedented in its rapidity, is of course only partly the result of globalization, but globalization is a major factor in many extinctions. It accelerates species loss in several ways. First, it increases the numbers of exotic species carried by the soaring plane, ship, rail, and truck traffic of global trade. Second, it is responsible for the adverse effects of ecotourism on wild flora and fauna (Ananthaswamy 2004). And third, it promotes the development and exploitation of populations and natural areas to satisfy the demands of global trade, including, in addition to the agricultural and energy-related disruptions already mentioned, logging, over-fishing of marine fisheries, road building, and mining. To give just one example, from 1985 to 2001, 56% of Indonesian Borneo's (Kalimantan) “protected” lowland forest areas—many of them remote and sparsely populated—were intensively logged, primarily to supply international timber markets (Curran et al. 2004). Surely one of the most significant impacts of globalization on wild species and the ecosystems in which they live has been the increase in introductions of invasive species (Vitousek et al. 1996; Mooney & Hobbs 2000). Two examples are zebra mussels (Dreissena polymorpha), which came to the Great Lakes in the mid-1980s in the ballast water of cargo ships from Europe, and Asian longhorn beetles (Anoplophera glabripennis), which arrived in the United States in the early 1990s in wood pallets and crates used to transfer cargo shipped from China and Korea. Zebra mussels, which are eliminating native mussels and altering lake ecosystems, clog the intake pipes of waterworks and power plants. The Asian longhorn beetle now seems poised to cause heavy tree loss (especially maples [Acer sp.]) in the hardwood forests of eastern North America. Along the U.S. Pacific coast, oaks (Quercus sp.) and tanoaks (Lithocarpus densiflorus) are being killed by sudden oak death, caused by a new, highly invasive fungal disease organism (Phytophthora ramorum), which is probably also an introduced species that was spread by the international trade in horticultural plants (Rizzo & Garbelotto 2003). Estimates of the annual cost of the damage caused by invasive species in the United States range from $5.5 billion to $115 billion. The zebra mussel alone, just one of a great many terrestrial, freshwater, and marine exotic animals, plants, and pathogens, has been credited with more than $5 billion of damage since its introduction (Mooney & Drake 1986; Cox 1999). Invasive species surely rank among the principal economic and ecological limiting factors for globalization. Some introduced species directly affect human health, either as vectors of disease or as the disease organisms themselves. For example, the Asian tiger mosquito (Aedes albopictus), a vector for dengue and yellow fevers, St. Louis and LaCrosse encephalitis viruses, and West Nile virus, was most likely introduced in used truck tires imported from Asia to Texas in the 1980s and has spread widely since then. Discussion of this and other examples is beyond the scope of this article. Even the partial control of accidental and deliberate species introductions requires stringent, well-funded governmental regulation in cooperation with the public and with business. Many introductions of alien species cannot be prevented, but some can, and successful interventions to prevent the spread of introduced species can have significant environmental and economic benefits. To give just one example, western Australia has shown that government and industry can cooperate to keep travelers and importers from bringing harmful invasive species across their borders. The western Australian HortGuard and GrainGuard programs integrate public education; rapid and effective access to information; targeted surveillance, which includes preborder, border, and postborder activities; and farm and regional biosecurity systems (Sharma 2004). Similar programs exist in New Zealand. But there is only so much that governments can do in the face of massive global trade. Some of the significant effects of globalization on wildlife are quite subtle. Mazzoni et al. (2003) reported that the newly appearing fungal disease chytridiomycosis (caused by Batrachochytrium dendrobatidis), which appears to be the causative agent for a number of mass die-offs and extinctions of amphibians on several continents, is probably being spread by the international restaurant trade in farmed North American bullfrogs (Rana catesbeiana). These authors state: “Our findings suggest that international trade may play a key role in the global dissemination of this and other emerging infectious diseases of wildlife.” Even more unexpected findings were described in 2002 by Alexander et al., who noted that expansion of ecotourism and other consequences of globalization are increasing contact between free-ranging wildlife and humans, resulting in the first recorded introduction of a primary human pathogen, Mycobacterium tuberculosis, into wild populations of banded mongooses (Mungos mungo) in Botswana and suricates (Suricata suricatta) in South Africa. The known effects of globalization on the environment are numerous and highly significant. Many others are undoubtedly unknown. Given these circumstances, the first question that suggests itself is: Will globalization, as we see it now, remain a permanent state of affairs (Rees 2002; Ehrenfeld 2003a)? The principal environmental side effects of globalization—climate change, resource exhaustion (particularly cheap energy), damage to agroecosystems, and the spread of exotic species, including pathogens (plant, animal, and human)—are sufficient to make this economic system unstable and short-lived. The socioeconomic consequences of globalization are likely to do the same. In my book The Arrogance of Humanism (1981), I claimed that our ability to manage global systems, which depends on our being able to predict the results of the things we do, or even to understand the systems we have created, has been greatly exaggerated. Much of our alleged control is science fiction; it doesn't work because of theoretical limits that we ignore at our peril. We live in a dream world in which reality testing is something we must never, never do, lest we awake. In 1984 Charles Perrow explored the reasons why we have trouble predicting what so many of our own created systems will do, and why they surprise us so unpleasantly while we think we are managing them. In his book Normal Accidents, which does not concern globalization, he listed the critical characteristics of some of today's complex systems. They are highly interlinked, so a change in one part can affect many others, even those that seem quite distant. Results of some processes feed back on themselves in unexpected ways. The controls of the system often interact with each other unpredictably. We have only indirect ways of finding out what is happening inside the system. And we have an incomplete understanding of some of the system's processes. His example of such a system is a nuclear power plant, and this, he explained, is why system-wide accidents in nuclear plants cannot be predicted or eliminated by system design. I would argue that globalization is a similar system, also subject to catastrophic accidents, many of them environmental—events that we cannot define until after they have occurred, and perhaps not even then. The comparatively few commentators who have predicted the collapse of globalization have generally given social reasons to support their arguments. These deserve some consideration here, if only because the environmental and social consequences of globalization interact so strongly with each other. In 1998, the British political economist John Gray, giving scant attention to environmental factors, nevertheless came to the conclusion that globalization is unstable and will be short-lived. He said, “There is nothing in today's global market that buffers it against the social strains arising from highly uneven economic development within and between the world's diverse societies.” The result, Gray states, is that “The combination of [an] unceasing stream of new technologies, unfettered market competition and weak or fractured social institutions” has weakened both sovereign states and multinational corporations in their ability to control important events. Note that Gray claims that not only nations but also multinational corporations, which are widely touted as controlling the world, are being weakened by globalization. This idea may come as a surprise, considering the growth of multinationals in the past few decades, but I believe it is true. Neither governments nor giant corporations are even remotely capable of controlling the environmental or social forces released by globalization, without first controlling globalization itself. Two of the social critics of globalization with the most dire predictions about its doom are themselves masters of the process. The late Sir James Goldsmith, billionaire financier, wrote in 1994, It must surely be a mistake to adopt an economic policy which makes you rich if you eliminate your national workforce and transfer production abroad, and which bankrupts you if you continue to employ your own people…. It is the poor in the rich countries who will subsidize the rich in the poor countries. This will have a serious impact on the social cohesion of nations. Another free-trade billionaire, George Soros, said much the same thing in 1995: “The collapse of the global marketplace would be a traumatic event with unimaginable consequences. Yet I find it easier to imagine than the continuation of the present regime.” How much more powerful these statements are if we factor in the environment! As globalization collapses, what will happen to people, biodiversity, and ecosystems? With respect to people, the gift of prophecy is not required to answer this question. What will happen depends on where you are and how you live. Many citizens of the Third World are still comparatively self-sufficient; an unknown number of these will survive the breakdown of globalization and its attendant chaos. In the developed world, there are also people with resources of self-sufficiency and a growing understanding of the nature of our social and environmental problems, which may help them bridge the years of crisis. Some species are adaptable; some are not. For the nonhuman residents of Earth, not all news will be bad. Who would have predicted that wild turkeys (Meleagris gallopavo), one of the wiliest and most evasive of woodland birds, extinct in New Jersey 50 years ago, would now be found in every county of this the most densely populated state, and even, occasionally, in adjacent Manhattan? Who would have predicted that black bears (Ursus americanus), also virtually extinct in the state in the mid-twentieth century, would now number in the thousands (Ehrenfeld 2001)? Of course these recoveries are unusual—rare bright spots in a darker landscape. Finally, a few ecological systems may survive in a comparatively undamaged state; most will be stressed to the breaking point, directly or indirectly, by many environmental and social factors interacting unpredictably. Lady Luck, as always, will have much to say. In his book The Collapse of Complex Societies, the archaeologist Joseph Tainter (1988) notes that collapse, which has happened to all past empires, inevitably results in human systems of lower complexity and less specialization, less centralized control, lower economic activity, less information flow, lower population levels, less trade, and less redistribution of resources. All of these changes are inimical to globalization. This less-complex, less-globalized condition is probably what human societies will be like when the dust settles. I do not think, however, that we can make such specific predictions about the ultimate state of the environment after globalization, because we have never experienced anything like this exceptionally rapid, global environmental damage before. History and science have little to tell us in this situation. The end of the current economic system and the transition to a postglobalized state is and will be accompanied by a desperate last raid on resources and a chaotic flurry of environmental destruction whose results cannot possibly be told in advance. All one can say is that the surviving species, ecosystems, and resources will be greatly impoverished compared with what we have now, and our descendants will not thank us for having adopted, however briefly, an economic system that consumed their inheritance and damaged their planet so wantonly. Environment is a true bottom line—concern for its condition must trump all purely economic growth strategies if both the developed and developing nations are to survive and prosper. Awareness of the environmental limits that globalized industrial society denies or ignores should not, however, bring us to an extreme position of environmental determinism. Those whose preoccupations with modern civilization's very real social problems cause them to reject or minimize the environmental constraints discussed here (Hollander 2003) are guilty of seeing only half the picture. Environmental scientists sometimes fall into the same error. It is tempting to see the salvation of civilization and environment solely in terms of technological improvements in efficiency of energy extraction and use, control of pollution, conservation of water, and regulation of environmentally harmful activities. But such needed developments will not be sufficient—or may not even occur—without corresponding social change, including an end to human population growth and the glorification of consumption, along with the elimination of economic mechanisms that increase the gap between rich and poor. The environmental and social problems inherent in globalization are completely interrelated—any attempt to treat them as separate entities is unlikely to succeed in easing the transition to a postglobalized world. Integrated change that combines environmental awareness, technological innovation, and an altered world view is the only answer to the life-threatening problems exacerbated by globalization (Ehrenfeld 2003b).

#### Our alternative is to decolonize economic engagement. Questioning the politics of space and knowledge that make engagement an economic tool of manipulation is key to sustainable development.

**Walsh, Estudios Culturales Latinoamericanos de la Universidad Andina Simón Bolívar, 2012**

(Catherine, “The Politics of Naming”, Cultural Studies, 26.1, Project Muse)

Cultural Studies, in our project, is constructed and understood as more than a field of ‘study’. It is broadly understand as a formation, a field of possibility and expression. And it is constructed as a space of encounter between disciplines and intellectual, political and ethical projects that seek to combat what Alberto Moreiras called the impoverishment of thought driven by divisions (disciplinary, epistemological, geographic, etc.) and the socio-political-cultural fragmentation that increasingly makes social change and intervention appear to be divided forces (Moreiras 2001). As such, Cultural Studies is conceived as a place of plural-, inter-, transand in-disciplinary (or undisciplined) critical thinking that takes as major concern the intimate relationships between culture, knowledge, politics and economics mentioned earlier, and that sees the problems of the region as both local and global. It is a space from which to search for ways of thinking, knowing, comprehending, feeling and acting that permit us to intervene and influence: a field that makes possible convergence and articulation, particularly between efforts, practices, knowledge and projects that focus on more global justice, on differences (epistemic, ontological, existential, of gender, ethnicity, class, race, nation, among others) constructed as inequalities within the framework of neo-liberal capitalism. It is a place that seeks answers, encourages intervention and engenders projects and proposals. It is in this frame of understanding and practice in our Ph.D. programme in Latin-American Cultural Studies at the Universidad Andina Simo´n Bolı´var, that this broad description-definition continues to take on more concrete characteristics. Here I can identify three that stand out: the inter-cultural, the inter-epistemic and the de-colonial. The inter-cultural has been and still is a central axis in the struggles and processes of social change in the Andean region. Its critical meaning was first affirmed near the end of the 1980s in the Ecuadorian indigenous movement’s political project. Here inter-culturality was positioned as an ideological principal grounded in the urgent need for a radical transformation of social structures, institutions and relationships, not only for indigenous peoples but also for society as a whole. Since then, inter-culturality has marked a social, political, ethical project and process that is also epistemological;6 a project and a process that seek to re-found the bases of the nation and national culture, understood as homogenous and mono-cultural. Such call for re-founding does not to simply add diversity to what is already established, but rather to rethink, rebuild and inter-culturalize the nation and national culture, and with in the terrains of knowledge, politics and life-based visions. It is this understanding of the inter-cultural that is of interest. Concretely, we are interested in the spaces of agency, creation, innovation and encounter between and among different subjects, knowledges, practices and visions. Referring to our project of Cultural Studies as (inter)Cultural Studies, enables and encourages us to think from this region, from the struggles, practices and processes that question Eurocentric, colonial and imperial legacies, and work to transform and create radically different conditions for thinking, encountering, being and coexisting or co-living. In a similar fashion, the inter-epistemic focuses on the need to question, interrupt and transgress the Euro-USA-centric epistemological frameworks that dominate Latin-American universities and even some Cultural Studies programmes. To think with knowledges produced in Latin America and the Caribbean (as well as in other ‘Souths’, including those located in the North) and by intellectuals who come not only from academia, but also from other projects, communities and social movements are, for us, a necessary and essential step, both in de-colonization and in creating other conditions of knowledge and understanding. Our project, thus, concerns itself with the work of inverting the geopolitics of knowledge, with placing attention on the historically subjugated and negated plurality of knowledge, logics and rationalities, and with the political-intellectual effort to create relationships, articulations and convergences between them. The de-colonial element is intimately related to the two preceding points. Here our interest is, on one hand, to make evident the thoughts, practices and experiences that both in the past and in the present have endeavoured to challenge the colonial matrix of power and domination, and to exist in spite of it, in its exterior and interior. By colonial matrix, we refer to the hierarchical system of racial civilizational classification that has operated and operates at different levels of life, including social identities (the superiority of white, heterosexual males), ontological-existential contexts (the dehumanization of indigenous and black peoples), epistemic contexts (the positioning of Euro-centrism as the only perspective of knowledge, thereby disregarding other epistemic rationalities), and cosmological (the control and/or negation of the ancestral-spiritual-territorial-existential bases that govern the life-systems of ancestral peoples, most especially those of African Diaspora and of Abya Yala) (see Quijano 1999). At the centre or the heart of this matrix is capitalism as the only possible model of civilization; the imposed social classification, the idea of ‘humanity’, the perspective of knowledge and the prototype life-system that goes with it defines itself through this capitalistic civilizational lens. As Quijano argues, by defending the interests of social domination and the exploitation of work under the hegemony of capital, ‘the ‘‘racialization’’ and the ‘‘capitalization’’ of social relationships of these models of power, and the ‘‘eurocentralization’’ of its control, are in the very roots of our present problems of identity,’ in Latin America as countries, ‘nations’ and States (Quijano 2006). It is precisely because of this that we consider the de-colonial to be a fundamental perspective. Within our project, the de-colonial does not seek to establish a new paradigm or line of thought but a critically-conscious understanding of the past and present that opens up and suggests questions, perspectives and paths to explore. As such, and on the other hand, we are interested in stimulating methodologies and pedagogies that, in the words of Jacqui Alexander (2005), cross the fictitious boundaries of exclusion and marginalization to contribute to the configuration of new ways of being and knowing rooted not in alterity itself, but in the principles of relation, complement and commitment. It is also to encourage other ways of reading, investigating and researching, of seeing, knowing, feeling, hearing and being, that challenge the singular reasoning of western modernity, make tense our own disciplinary frameworks of ‘study’ and interpretation, and persuade a questioning from and with radically distinct rationalities, knowledge, practices and civilizational-life-systems. It is through these three pillars of the inter-cultural, the inter-epistemic and the de-colonial that we attempt to understand the processes, experiences and struggles that are occurring in Latin America and elsewhere. But it is also here that we endeavour to contribute to and learn from the complex relationships between culture-politics-economics, knowledge and power in the world today; to unlearn to relearn from and with perspectives otherwise. Practices, experiences and challenges In this last section, my interest is to share some of the particularities of our doctorate programme/project, now in its third cycle; its achievements and advancements; and the challenges that it faces in an academic context, increasingly characterized regionally and internationally, by disciplinarity, depolitization, de-subjectivation, apathy, competitive individualism and nonintervention. Without a doubt, one of the unique characteristics of the programme/ project is its students: all mid-career professionals mainly from the Andean region and from such diverse fields as the social sciences, humanities, the arts, philosophy, communication, education and law. The connection that the majority of the students have with social and cultural movements and/or processes, along with their dedication to teaching or similar work, helps to contribute to dynamic debate and discussion not always seen in academia and post-graduate programmes. Similarly, the faculty of the programme stand out for being internationally renowned intellectuals, and, the majority, for their commitment to struggles of social transformation, critical thinking and the project of the doctorate itself. The curriculum offering is based on courses and seminars that seek to foment thinking from Latin American and with its intellectuals in all of their diversity comprehend, confront and affect the problems and realities of the region, which are not only local but global. The pedagogical methodological perspective aforementioned works to stimulate processes of collective thought and allow the participants to think from related formations, experiences and research topics and to think with the differences disciplinary, geographical, epistemic and subjective thereby fracturing individualism by dialoguing, transgressing and inter-crossing boundaries. Trans-disciplinarity, as such, is a fundamental position and process in our project. The fact that the graduate students come from an array of different backgrounds provides a plurality in which the methodologicalpedagogical practice becomes the challenge of collectively thinking, crossing disciplinary backgrounds and creating new positions and perspectives, conceived and formed in a trans-disciplinary way. The majority of courses, seminars and professors, also assume that this is a necessary challenge in today’s world when no single discipline and no single intellectual is capable alone of analyzing, comprehending or transforming social reality. Nevertheless, trans-disciplinary gains continue to be a point of criticism and contention, especially given the present trend to re-discipline the LatinAmerican university. As Edgardo Lander has argued (2000a), this tendency reflects the neo-liberalization of higher education, as well as the increasing conservatism of intellectuals, including those that previously identified as or to continue to identify themselves as progressives and/or leftists. To establish oneself in a discipline or presume truth through a discipline, a common practice today, is to reinstall the geopolitics of knowing. This, in turn, strengthens Euro-USA-centrism as ‘the place’ of theory and knowledge. As such, the subject of dispute is not simply the trans-disciplinary aspect of Cultural Studies but also its ‘indisciplinary’ nature, that is, the effort central to our project to include points of view that come from Latin America and thinkers who are not always connected to academia (see Walsh et al. 2002). Our interest is not, as some claim, to facilitate the agendas or cultural agency of subaltern groups or social movements, promote activism or simply include other knowledge forms, but instead to build a different political-intellectual project a political-intellectual project otherwise. Such project gives centrality to the need to learn to think from, together and with LatinAmerican reality and its actors, thereby stimulating convergences, articulations and inter-culturalizations that aim at creating an academia that is committed to life itself. Such a perspective does not eliminate or deny knowledge conceived in Europe or North America usually named as ‘universal’ or its proponents and thinkers. Instead, it incorporates such knowledge as part of a broader canon and worldview that seeks pluriversality, recognizing the importance of places and loci of enunciation. For our project, all of this serves to highlight the doubly complicated situation that is still in flux. On one hand, there is the negative association with trans-disciplinarity and the academic suppositions that accompany it, particularly in the area of research; this requires that our theses be doubly rigorous. And, on the other hand, there is the geopolitical limitation not only of disciplines but also of academic disciplining. To argue, as we do, that knowledge and thought are also produced outside of universities and, in dialogue with Hall, that political movements also produce and provoke theoretic moments and movements, is to question and challenge the academic logic and the authority of a universal and singular reasoning and science. We will, through such questioning and challenges, always be marginalized, placed on the fringe, under a microscope, criticized and disputed. Because of this, the challenges that we have encountered have been many. On one hand, there are those challenges that many face in the Latin-American academic context: the real difficulties of financing, infrastructure and research support. On the other hand, are the challenges that come with the traditional academic disciplinary structure, its de-politization and de-subjectification. Here the challenge is to transgress the established norms of neutrality, distance and objectivity. It is also to confront the standards that give little relevance to historically subjugated groups, practices and knowledges, and to the interlinking of race, ethnicity, gender and sexuality with the structures and models of power and knowledge. It is to make evident past and present struggles that give real meaning to the arguments of heterogeneity, decoloniality and inter-culturality. Here the criticism and dispute comes from many sides: from those who describe these efforts as too politicized (and, as such, supposedly less ‘academic’), uni-paradigmatic (supposedly limited to only one ‘line of thought’), fundamentalist (supposedly exclusionary of those subjects not marked by the colonial wound) and as obsessed with conflict (and therefore far from the tradition of ‘culture’, its letters and object of study). These challenges together with the tensions, criticisms and disputes that they mark often times make the path more difficult. Still, and at the same time, they allow us to clarify the distinctive and unique aspects of our project and its motivations to continue with its course of construction, insurgence and struggle. Our concern here is not so much with the institutionalizing of Cultural Studies. Better yet, and in a much broader fashion, we are concerned with epistemic inter-culturalization, with the de-colonialization and pluriversalization of the ‘university’, and with a thinking from the South(s). To place these concerns, as argued here, within a perspective and a politics of naming: ‘(inter)Cultural Studies in de-colonial code,’ is to open, not close, paths. Conclusion In concluding the reflections I have presented here, it is useful to return to a fundamental point touched by Stuart Hall: ‘intervention’. In particular and with Hall, I refer to the will to intervene in and transform the world, an intervention that does not simply relate to social and political contexts and fields, but also to epistemology and theory. That is to an intervention and transformation in and a de-colonization of the frameworks and logics of our thinking, knowing and comprehending. To commit oneself in mind, body and spirit as Frantz Fanon argued. To consider Cultural Studies today a project of political vocation and intervention is to position and at the same time build our work on the borders of and the boundaries between university and society. It is to seriously reflect on whom we read and with whom we want and/or need to dialogue and think, to understand the very limits or our knowledge. And precisely because of this, it is to act on our own situation, establishing contacts and exchanges of different kinds in a pedagogicalmethodological zeal to think from and think with, in what I have elsewhere called a critical inter-culturality and de-colonial pedagogy (Walsh 2009). In universities and societies that are increasingly characterized by nonintervention, auto-complacency, individualism and apathy, intervention represents, suggests and promotes a position and practice of involvement, action and complicity. To take on such a position and practice and to make it an integral part of our political-intellectual project is to find not only ethical meaning in work on culture and power, but also to give this work some heart. That is to say, to focus on the ever-greater need and urgency of life. To call these Cultural Studies or critical (inter)Cultural Studies is only one of our options, and part of the politics of naming.

### 1NC Adv CP

#### The 50 state governments of the United States should create and capitalize green banks by re-programing existing state level support for renewable energy. We’ll clarify.

#### Establishment of state green banks creates sustainable low cost financing for renewable energy.

**Berlin, Coalition for Green Capital policy and planning vice president, 2011**

(Kenneth, “Creating State Green Banks: How New Ways to Finance Clean Energy and Energy Efficiency Projects Can Reduce the Cost of Clean Energy and Replace Expiring Federal Credits and Subsidies”, <http://www.stateinnovation.org/Events/Event-Listing/Policy-Directors-Annual-Meeting-2011.aspx>, ldg)

Transitioning to a clean economy will occur only if clean energy and energy efficiency projects are deployed to scale. However, many analysts have described the serious challenge posed by the “deployment valley of death” to new energy technologies. The deployment valley of death problem arises for four basic reasons: (i) most new technologies, even after they become mature enough so there is little technology risk in using the technology, face a long cost curve in which the cost of the technology decrease as the technology reaches scale and is gradually improved; (ii) while renewable energy projects have been dropping in cost, in most cases the delivered cost of energy from clean energy projects is still higher then the delivered cost of energy from existing power generation facilities; (iii) in most states, the utility commission and most political leaders will not support projects that increase more than minimally the delivered cost of electricity; and (iv) it is very unlikely that a cost will be put on carbon emissions on a national level for many years. Thus, despite rapidly dropping costs, new construction in the clean energy industry is still highly dependent on subsidies, grants, and tax credits. In 2010, the federal government provided $14.674 billion in subsides and other support to renewable energy projects and another $14.838 billion to energy efficiency projects (conservation and end use in the chart below). Of this amount, $6.193 billion of the renewable energy funding and $7.854 billion of the conservation and end use programs were provided under ARRA. Because of budget limitations and the end of many programs funded by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA), much of this funding is likely to disappear in the near term. One way for states to proceed is to wait and hold back from supporting clean energy projects until new innovation lowers the cost of these projects enough so that they are cost competitive without any further action by states. Although there are some authors who argue for this approach, there is very little history of the introduction of new innovations in the energy industry that are cost competitive on their first days before they are produced at scale. Most new energy technologies, including breakthrough technologies, require an incubation period and incentives to achieve scale despite early cost disadvantages. Others, even after they become cost competitive, face other difficult barriers to entry. In a 2001 study, Shell concluded that in its industry it took on the average 25 years after the commercial introduction of a primary energy form for a cost competitive technology to obtain a 1% worldwide market share. Meanwhile, current wind and solar technologies are decreasing in cost. Support is needed for innovation research – massive support given the low level of energy R&D in America - but that is no substitute for deployment of existing technologies. States that wait for new innovative technologies are likely to lose out on the deployment of clean energy projects. Bringing energy efficiency projects to scale also requires new sources of financing. Energy efficiency projects generate large numbers of jobs, but bringing energy efficiency projects to scale faces daunting challenges. When faced with a choice of spending scare dollars on energy efficiency rather than other uses, most homeowners and small businessmen, and even many large businesses, choose projects other than energy efficiency. As a result, most energy programs subsidize the cost of energy efficiency projects and many experts believe that 100% subsidies or financing of the upfront costs of energy efficiency projects is needed. Providing these funds will be very costly. According to the Energy Information Agency (EIA), in 2010 there were expected to be 82.56 million single family homes and 25.57 million families living in multiple family homes. While the costs of improving a home’s energy efficiency vary by region and technology, reducing residential energy use by 25 percent by 2020 can cost each homeowner over $10,000. Assuming that each homeowner spent $10,000 to achieve about a 25 percent reduction in energy use, it would cost about $108 trillion. Similarly, EIA estimates that there are about 5 million commercial buildings with about 81.2 billion square feet in the U.S. There are also about 11 billion square feet of industrial floor space in the US. At an average premium for green buildings of $3-5 per square foot, it could cost in the neighborhood of $275 - $460 billion to retrofit this space. States should develop a new model to fund clean energy and energy efficiency programs. The model would recognize that federal and state appropriations, tax credits and other incentives and subsidies will be sharply diminished in the years ahead because of the budget crisis at all levels of government. States would suffer sharp economic losses if they were unable to replace these funds and develop strong clean energy and energy efficiency industries in their state. Developing this new model thus requires a new paradigm on how to finance these projects. Green banks are ideally suited to solve these problems because they offer a practical way for states to make available low-cost financing for project developers in their states. First, they can be established from existing state programs with the equivalent of substantial new resources resulting from their ability to leverage funds – one dollar of leveraged funds could support 5, 10 or even more dollars of investment. Because they would be financial institutions providing debt financing, they would be repaid on their loans, putting them in the position to borrow funds and to establish revolving loan funds that would provide funds that could be reinvested without new sources of financing. Green banks, if established as separate institutions, could issue bonds without the full faith and credit of the state and without restrictions facing states which have limited borrowing capacity. Finally, green banks could seek investors with patient long term capital who are seeking a long term conservative rate of return, such as pension fund investors. Such green banks would finance the deployment of clean energy projects with low technology risks, including projects using existing wind and solar technologies. These projects, because of low technology risk and low financing risk, particularly when they have entered into long term power purchase agreements to purchase their output, should be able to attract investors interested in long tem, safe returns and are thus willing to accept rates of return at a conservative level. State green banks could be expanded to cover innovative, risky new technologies and manufacturing facilities, but each of these presents' different risk factors and would require a different funding "window" within the bank. The details of establishing such windows are not discussed in this paper. In addition, the green bank would provide low cost financing for energy efficiency projects.

### 1NC Saudis DA

#### Saudi Arabia fears the narrative that the US may abandon them for North American supplies – it’s the only thing stopping them from getting the bomb

Rogers 12

[3-20-2013 – Will Rogers is the Bacevich Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). At CNAS, Mr. Rogers’ research focus is on science, technology and national security policy. He has authored or co-authored a range of publications on energy, climate change, environmental cooperation in Asia and cybersecurity, “America Committed to Gulf Security Despite Changing Relationship with Region's Oil, says Gen. Dempsey,” Center for New American Security, 2013, http://www.cnas.org/blogs/naturalsecurity/2013/03/america-committed-gulf-security-despite-changing-relationship-regions-]

America’s relationship with the Middle East’s energy resources is changing as U.S. domestic oil production continues to grow. A combination of hydraulic fracturing, horizontal drilling and advanced seismic technologies have contributed to the largest annual growth in U.S. crude oil production since Colonel Edwin Drake first drilled for oil in Titusville, Pennsylvania in 1859. Most of the crude oil is coming from shale formations in North Dakota and Texas – what we call “light tight oil.” Since 2010, the United States has, on average, increased monthly crude oil production by 50,000 barrels a day.¶ Not all of this U.S. light tight oil is displacing Middle East crude, of course. A number of factors matter, most importantly the crude oil grade. The United States is producing light tight oil, that is, low-density crude oil, whereas the United States imports heavier crudes from the Persian Gulf, including from Saudi Arabia. Moreover, U.S. refineries have been increasingly geared to absorb heavier crudes, from the Persian Gulf, but more so from Canada, Mexico and Venezuela.¶ Nevertheless, the glut in U.S. crude oil production and declining demand for oil (a consequence of slow economic growth and more fuel efficient vehicles) have contributed to a powerful notion that the United States is relying less and less on oil from the Persian Gulf and could conceivably help wean America off crude oil imports from the Middle East entirely (a debatable point).¶ Whether or not one believes that the United States can break the tether to Middle East oil, U.S. allies and partners in the Persian Gulf are increasingly nervous about America’s long-term security commitment to the region. After all, if the United States no longer relies on energy from the region, why should American foot the bill for protecting the sea lanes – that backbone of the crude oil trade in the region – or so the narrative goes.¶ The United States has a number of stakes in stability of the Persian Gulf oil trade even if it does rely less on oil from the region. Supply shocks will contribute to higher global oil prices, which will be felt at home. Moreover, supply shocks are damaging to our allies, particularly those in East Asia that have grown more dependent on oil and gas from the Middle East and North Africa. But there are other legitimate security concerns as well, which were not far from General Martin Dempsey’s mind when he responded to a question on Monday about how the American energy revolution will impact U.S. interests and presence in the Persian Gulf. Here’s what the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said:If by 2017 the United States can achieve some level of energy independence, why in the world would we continue to be concerned about the energy that flows out of – out of the Gulf? Well, look, my answer to that is I didn’t go to the Gulf in 1991 and stay there for about the next 20 years because of oil. That’s not why I went. It’s not why my children went. It’s –and we went there because we thought that a region of the world where we had – where we had not, except for a few bilateral relationships – where we hadn’t invested much of our, let’s call it, bandwidth, intellectual energy, commitment – now, we went there in ’91 because of the – of the aggression of Saddam Hussein, but we stayed there because I think we came to the realization that the future of the region was tied to our future, and not through this thing called oil but rather through the – as I said earlier, the shared interest in a common future where people would be able to build a better life and where threats could be managed collaboratively, not by the United States uniquely but by the relationships we would build on the basis of common interests. So when I hear about in 2017, you know, oil won’t be as big a factor for us – and that’s great. I hope we do achieve energy independence. But I can assure you that at least from a military perspective – and I can only speak, as I dress, from the military perspective – that the continued development of capabilities – military capabilities, notably, in my world, but also partnerships and trust that we build by working together, by exchanging officers and noncommissioned officers in our professional military schools, that on that basis, you will find –you will find that the future will be a period of greater commitment.¶ Now, you know, if you measure our commitment in terms of numbers of boots on the ground and numbers of aircraft and number of aircraft carriers, I think you’ll probably –you know, there’ll always be this debate about inclining or declining commitment. But that’s not what the commitment’s all about, really, in my view. As I said, I went to – I went to the Gulf in ’91, spent almost the next 20 years there on and off and didn’t do it for oil.¶ So we have two powerful strategic cross-currents that the Obama administration will have to confront in the near term.¶ This week marks the anniversary of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, a solemn reminder for some that the United States should be less engaged in the Middle East, not more. Add this to the notion that the United States could break the tether to Middle East oil, and the domestic narrative speaks for itself. At the same time, though, a credible U.S. security commitment to our partners in the Persian Gulf may be the only way to allay concerns about security challenges in the region. Take for example, Iran. My colleagues Colin Kahl, Melissa Dalton and Matt Irvine recently published a report assessing the possibility that an Iranian bomb could lead to Saudi Arabia developing the bomb – Atomic Kingdom: If Iran Builds the Bomb, Will Saudi Arabia be Next? Kahl, Dalton and Irvine argue quite persuasively that a number of factors will keep Saudi Arabia from developing the bomb. But one of the big caveats to this is a credible U.S. security commitment to Saudi Arabia. Does the Royal Family in Riyadh feel comfortable about this commitment given the competing narrative that America may have an opportunity to walk away from the Persian Gulf if it doesn’t need access to the region’s oil? The public perception on these issues - at home and abroad - will have to be managed carefully. What a tightrope to walk.

#### New oil markets makes Saudis *perceive* decline in US-Saudi ties.

House ‘12

(not oft-disgruntled House, M.D., but Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist and former publisher of The Wall Street Journal, Karen Elliott House. Carnegie Council Transcripts and Articles – November 30, 2012 – lexis)

QUESTION: Warren Hoge[28], International Peace Institute.¶ Karen, there's a lot of talk in American politics about the desire to become energy independent, no longer dependent upon countries like Saudi Arabia, and there's a real possibility that could happen. The numbers are there, fracking and offshore oil, that sort of thing. Suppose that does happen. How would that affect our relationship with Saudi Arabia, and is this something the Saudis themselves worry about?¶ KAREN ELLIOTT HOUSE: I don't think they like it when we talk about energy independence. They do take that as a personal insult. I think it would loosen somewhat our sense of dependence. But the global economy is still going to be not we so much; I mean we're not a major importer of Saudi oil now but the global economy is a major importer of Saudi oil and will continue to be.¶ There are a lot of people, like John Deutch[29], who is a very smart man and certainly knows energy, who believes that it doesn't matter who runs Saudi Arabia, they will export oil. And they obviously will export some. But if you assume that if anything happened to take the royal family out of the picture, the only other organized structure because nothing is allowed to organize, no book clubs, no photography clubs, no soccer leagues other than the one the government runs is the religious organization. There are 70,000 mosques all over the country. That's basically one for every 150 men. So that's the most organized group.

#### Saudi prolif causes nuclear war.

Edelman ‘11

(Eric –Distinguished Fellow at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments & Former U.S. Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, Foreign Affairs, Jan/Feb, http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/67162/eric-s-edelman-andrew-f-krepinevich-jr-and-evan-braden-montgomer/the-dangers-of-a-nuclear-iran)

There is, however, at least one state that could receive significant outside support: Saudi Arabia. And if it did, proliferation could accelerate throughout the region. Iran and Saudi Arabia have long been geopolitical and ideological rivals. Riyadh would face tremendous pressure to respond in some form to a nuclear-armed Iran, not only to deter Iranian coercion and subversion but also to preserve its sense that Saudi Arabia is the leading nation in the Muslim world. The Saudi government is already pursuing a nuclear power capability, which could be the first step along a slow road to nuclear weapons development. And concerns persist that it might be able to accelerate its progress by exploiting its close ties to Pakistan. During the 1980s, in response to the use of missiles during the Iran-Iraq War and their growing proliferation throughout the region, Saudi Arabia acquired several dozen css-2 intermediate-range ballistic missiles from China. The Pakistani government reportedly brokered the deal, and it may have also offered to sell Saudi Arabia nuclear warheads for the css-2s, which are not accurate enough to deliver conventional warheads effectively. There are still rumors that Riyadh and Islamabad have had discussions involving nuclear weapons, nuclear technology, or security guarantees. This “Islamabad option” could develop in one of several different ways. Pakistan could sell operational nuclear weapons and delivery systems to Saudi Arabia, or it could provide the Saudis with the infrastructure, material, and technical support they need to produce nuclear weapons themselves within a matter of years, as opposed to a decade or longer. Not only has Pakistan provided such support in the past, but it is currently building two more heavy-water reactors for plutonium production and a second chemical reprocessing facility to extract plutonium from spent nuclear fuel. In other words, it might accumulate more fissile material than it needs to maintain even a substantially expanded arsenal of its own. Alternatively, Pakistan might offer an extended deterrent guarantee to Saudi Arabia and deploy nuclear weapons, delivery systems, and troops on Saudi territory, a practice that the United States has employed for decades with its allies. This arrangement could be particularly appealing to both Saudi Arabia and Pakistan. It would allow the Saudis to argue that they are not violating the NPT since they would not be acquiring their own nuclear weapons. And an extended deterrent from Pakistan might be preferable to one from the United States because stationing foreign Muslim forces on Saudi territory would not trigger the kind of popular opposition that would accompany the deployment of U.S. troops. Pakistan, for its part, would gain financial benefits and international clout by deploying nuclear weapons in Saudi Arabia, as well as strategic depth against its chief rival, India. The Islamabad option raises a host of difficult issues, perhaps the most worrisome being how India would respond. Would it target Pakistan’s weapons in Saudi Arabia with its own conventional or nuclear weapons? How would this expanded nuclear competition influence stability during a crisis in either the Middle East or South Asia? Regardless of India’s reaction, any decision by the Saudi government to seek out nuclear weapons, by whatever means, would be highly destabilizing. It would increase the incentives of other nations in the Middle East to pursue nuclear weapons of their own. And it could increase their ability to do so by eroding the remaining barriers to nuclear proliferation: each additional state that acquires nuclear weapons weakens the nonproliferation regime, even if its particular method of acquisition only circumvents, rather than violates, the NPT. Were Saudi Arabia to acquire nuclear weapons, the Middle East would count three nuclear-armed states, and perhaps more before long. It is unclear how such an n-player competition would unfold because most analyses of nuclear deterrence are based on the U.S.- Soviet rivalry during the Cold War. It seems likely, however, that the interaction among three or more nuclear-armed powers would be more prone to miscalculation and escalation than a bipolar competition. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union only needed to concern themselves with an attack from the other. Multi- polar systems are generally considered to be less stable than bipolar systems because coalitions can shift quickly, upsetting the balance of power and creating incentives for an attack. More important, emerging nuclear powers in the Middle East might not take the costly steps necessary to preserve regional stability and avoid a nuclear exchange. For nuclear-armed states, the bedrock of deterrence is the knowledge that each side has a secure second-strike capability, so that no state can launch an attack with the expectation that it can wipe out its opponents’ forces and avoid a devastating retaliation. However, emerging nuclear powers might not invest in expensive but survivable capabilities such as hardened missile silos or submarine- based nuclear forces. Given this likely vulnerability, the close proximity of states in the Middle East, and the very short flight times of ballistic missiles in the region, any new nuclear powers might be compelled to “launch on warning” of an attack or even, during a crisis, to use their nuclear forces preemptively. Their governments might also delegate launch authority to lower-level commanders, heightening the possibility of miscalculation and escalation. Moreover, if early warning systems were not integrated into robust command-and-control systems, the risk of an unauthorized or accidental launch would increase further still. And without sophisticated early warning systems, a nuclear attack might be unattributable or attributed incorrectly. That is, assuming that the leadership of a targeted state survived a first strike, it might not be able to accurately determine which nation was responsible. And this uncertainty, when combined with the pressure to respond quickly, would create a significant risk that it would retaliate against the wrong party, potentially triggering **a regional nuclear war**. Most existing nuclear powers have taken steps to protect their nuclear weapons from unauthorized use: from closely screening key personnel to developing technical safety measures, such as permissive action links, which require special codes before the weapons can be armed. Yet there is no guarantee that emerging nuclear powers would be willing or able to implement these measures, creating a significant risk that their governments might lose control over the weapons or nuclear material and that nonstate actors could gain access to these items. Some states might seek to mitigate threats to their nuclear arsenals; for instance, they might hide their weapons. In that case, however, a single intelligence compromise could leave their weapons vulnerable to attack or theft. Meanwhile, states outside the Middle East could also be a source of instability. Throughout the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were engaged in a nuclear arms race that other nations were essentially powerless to influence. In a multipolar nuclear Middle East, other nuclear powers and states with advanced military technology could influence—for good or ill—the military competition within the region by selling or transferring technologies that most local actors lack today: solid-fuel rocket motors, enhanced missile-guidance systems, war- head miniaturization technology, early warning systems, air and missile defenses. Such transfers could stabilize a fragile nuclear balance if the emerging nuclear powers acquired more survivable arsenals as a result. But they could also be highly destabilizing. If, for example, an outside power sought to curry favor with a potential client state or gain influence with a prospective ally, it might share with that state the technology it needed to enhance the accuracy of its missiles and thereby increase its ability to launch a disarming first strike against any adversary. The ability of existing nuclear powers and other technically advanced military states to shape the emerging nuclear competition in the Middle East could lead to a new Great Game, with unpredictable consequences.

### Solvency

**Plan fails – Mexican law and subnational governments**

**Bonner et al 10** (Robert C. Bonner, Former Commissioner of U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Former Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration; Andres Rozental, Former Deputy Foreign Minister of Mexico; Former President and Founder Mexican Council on Foreign Relations (COMEXI); http://www.pacificcouncil.org/document.doc?id=31)

**At present,** however, **there is no** such a thing as an energy agenda for the border region: no true **market for electricity across the border**, no binational plan for electricity generation or transmission, and no program to develop new technologies or energy reserves. **One significant obstacle to cross-border cooperation on energy is that Mexican law places a state-owned monopoly, the Federal Electricity Commission, in charge of electricity generation and transmission. Several reforms to this state-owned monopoly are necessary for a cross-border energy market to function, including a standardized investment regime for both countries and direct negotiations between subnational governments across the border.**

#### CBT threatens biodiversity

Chris Clarke 8/20/12 Reporter for Rewire. “Green Light for Cross-Border Power Line Between U.S. and Mexico.”

http://www.kcet.org/news/rewire/the-grid/green-light-for-cross-border-power-line.html

The transmission project has raised opposition due to its contribution to the increasing industrialization of San Diego County's backcountry, but most opposition to date has been focused on the wind project to which the power line connects. The 2009 application for the Energía Sierra Juárez project to Mexico's environmental ministry, Secretaria de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales described a proposed 700,000-acre footprint with 1,000 wind turbines each producing 1.25 megawatts and more than 500 miles of roads running among them. The Sierra Juárez mountains are considered a "sky island" in the northern Baja desert, with thick conifer forests and a high level of biodiversity.

#### CBT and related projects destroy soil, water, and endangered species habitats

Nicholas Puga, 10/24/08 Partner at the Border Energy Forum XV in Monterey, Nuevo Leon. “Wind and Energy Resource Development Along the Baja California-U.S. Border: Progress and Potential Hurdles.”

In early 2008, two environmental groups protested the CPUC’s approval of SCE’s 250MW RPS contract with Baja Wind, LLC, Sempra’s project in La Rumorosa, listing 18 unaddressed environmental impacts and linking the approval of the project to that of the Sunrise Transmission Project (STP). The impacts range from potential bat and avian collisions to impacts on endangered and threatened species habitat, as well as soil and water impacts. The protest links the wind project to the CEQA/NEPA EIR/EIS project of the cross-border line to interconnect to the STP. It called for the remediation of the impacts prior to approval of the project. It called for the wind project permitting process to satisfy the same environmental requirements as a similar project in California.

#### Biodiversity in *specific hotspots* checks extinction. Key to *ag*, *medicine*, and *ecosystems*

Mittermeier ‘11

(et al, Dr. Russell Alan Mittermeier is a primatologist, herpetologist and biological anthropologist. He holds Ph.D. from Harvard in Biological Anthropology and serves as an Adjunct Professor at the State University of New York at Stony Brook. He has conducted fieldwork for over 30 years on three continents and in more than 20 countries in mainly tropical locations. He is the President of Conservation International and he is considered an expert on biological diversity. Mittermeier has formally discovered several monkey species. From Chapter One of the book Biodiversity Hotspots – F.E. Zachos and J.C. Habel (eds.), DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-20992-5\_1, # Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2011. This evidence also internally references Norman Myers, a very famous British environmentalist specialising in biodiversity. available at: http://www.academia.edu/1536096/Global\_biodiversity\_conservation\_the\_critical\_role\_of\_hotspots)

Extinction is the gravest consequence of the biodiversity crisis, since it is¶ irreversible. Human activities have elevated the rate of species extinctions to a¶ thousand or more times the natural background rate (Pimm et al. 1995). What are the¶ consequences of this loss? Most obvious among them may be the lost opportunity¶ for future resource use. Scientists have discovered a mere fraction of Earth’s species¶ (perhaps fewer than 10%, or even 1%) and understood the biology of even fewer¶ (Novotny et al. 2002). As species vanish, so too does the health security of every¶ human. Earth’s species are a vast genetic storehouse that may harbor a cure for¶ cancer, malaria, or the next new pathogen – cures waiting to be discovered.¶ Compounds initially derived from wild species account for more than half of all¶ commercial medicines – even more in developing nations (Chivian and Bernstein¶ 2008). Natural forms, processes, and ecosystems provide blueprints and inspiration¶ for a growing array of new materials, energy sources, hi-tech devices, and¶ other innovations (Benyus 2009). The current loss of species has been compared¶ to burning down the world’s libraries without knowing the content of 90% or¶ more of the books. With loss of species, we lose the ultimate source of our crops¶ and the genes we use to improve agricultural resilience, the inspiration for¶ manufactured products, and the basis of the structure and function of the ecosystems¶ that support humans and all life on Earth (McNeely et al. 2009). Above and beyond¶ material welfare and livelihoods, biodiversity contributes to security, resiliency,¶ and freedom of choices and actions (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005).¶ Less tangible, but no less important, are the cultural, spiritual, and moral costs¶ inflicted by species extinctions. All societies value species for their own sake,¶ and wild plants and animals are integral to the fabric of all the world’s cultures¶ (Wilson 1984). The road to extinction is made even more perilous to people by the loss of the broader ecosystems that underpin our livelihoods, communities, and economies(McNeely et al.2009). The loss of coastal wetlands and mangrove forests, for example, greatly exacerbates both human mortality and economic damage from tropical cyclones (Costanza et al.2008; Das and Vincent2009), while disease outbreaks such as the 2003 emergence of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome in East Asia have been directly connected to trade in wildlife for human consumption(Guan et al.2003). Other consequences of biodiversity loss, more subtle but equally damaging, include the deterioration of Earth’s natural capital. Loss of biodiversity on land in the past decade alone is estimated to be costing the global economy $500 billion annually (TEEB2009). Reduced diversity may also reduce resilience of ecosystems and the human communities that depend on them. For example, more diverse coral reef communities have been found to suffer less from the diseases that plague degraded reefs elsewhere (Raymundo et al.2009). As Earth’s climate changes, the roles of species and ecosystems will only increase in their importance to humanity (Turner et al.2009).¶ In many respects, conservation is local. People generally care more about the biodiversity in the place in which they live. They also depend upon these ecosystems the most – and, broadly speaking, it is these areas over which they have the most control. Furthermore, we believe that all biodiversity is important and that every nation, every region, and every community should do everything possible to conserve their living resources. So, what is the importance of setting global priorities? Extinction is a global phenomenon, with impacts far beyond nearby administrative borders. More practically, biodiversity, the threats to it, and the ability of countries to pay for its conservation vary around the world. The vast majority of the global conservation budget – perhaps 90% – originates in and is spent in economically wealthy countries (James et al.1999). It is thus critical that those globally ﬂexible funds available – in the hundreds of millions annually – be guided by systematic priorities if we are to move deliberately toward a global goal of reducing biodiversity loss.¶ The establishment of priorities for biodiversity conservation is complex, but can be framed as a single question. Given the choice, where should action toward reducing the loss of biodiversity be implemented ﬁrst? The ﬁeld of conservation planning addresses this question and revolves around a framework of vulnerability and irreplaceability (Margules and Pressey2000). Vulnerability measures the risk to the species present in a region – if the species and ecosystems that are highly threatened are not protected now, we will not get another chance in the future. Irreplaceability measures the extent to which spatial substitutes exist for securing biodiversity. The number of species alone is an inadequate indication of conserva-tion priority because several areas can share the same species. In contrast, areas with high levels of endemism are irreplaceable. We must conserve these places because the unique species they contain cannot be saved elsewhere. Put another way, biodiversity is not evenly distributed on our planet. It is heavily concentrated in certain areas, these areas have exceptionally high concentrations of endemic species found nowhere else, and many (but not all) of these areas are the areas at greatest risk of disappearing because of heavy human impact.¶ Myers’ seminal paper (Myers1988) was the ﬁrst application of the principles of irreplaceability and vulnerability to guide conservation planning on a global scale. Myers described ten tropical forest “hotspots” on the basis of extraordinary plant endemism and high levels of habitat loss, albeit without quantitative criteria for the designation of “hotspot” status. A subsequent analysis added eight additional hotspots, including four from Mediterranean-type ecosystems (Myers 1990).After adopting hotspots as an institutional blueprint in 1989, Conservation Interna-tional worked with Myers in a ﬁrst systematic update of the hotspots. It introduced two strict quantitative criteria: to qualify as a hotspot, a region had to contain at least 1,500 vascular plants as endemics (¶ >¶ 0.5% of the world’s total), and it had to have 30% or less of its original vegetation (extent of historical habitat cover)remaining. These efforts culminated in an extensive global review (Mittermeier et al.1999) and scientiﬁc publication (Myers et al.2000) that introduced seven new hotspots on the basis of both the better-deﬁned criteria and new data. A second systematic update (Mittermeier et al.2004) did not change the criteria, but revisited the set of hotspots based on new data on the distribution of species and threats, as well as genuine changes in the threat status of these regions. That update redeﬁned several hotspots, such as the Eastern Afromontane region, and added several others that were suspected hotspots but for which sufﬁcient data either did not exist or were not accessible to conservation scientists outside of those regions. Sadly, it uncovered another region – the East Melanesian Islands – which rapid habitat destruction had in a short period of time transformed from a biodiverse region that failed to meet the “less than 30% of original vegetation remaining” criterion to a genuine hotspot.

### Advantage 1 Grid Collapse

#### Transmission is being improved in the status quo

Chris Clarke 8/20/12 Reporter for Rewire. “Green Light for Cross-Border Power Line Between U.S. and Mexico.”

http://www.kcet.org/news/rewire/the-grid/green-light-for-cross-border-power-line.html

The Department of Energy announced Friday that the Obama administration has given the go-ahead to connecting wind turbines in Baja to the U.S. grid. According to Friday's Federal Register, the administration has granted "a Presidential permit to Energía Sierra Juárez U.S. Transmission, LLC (ESJ), to construct, operate, maintain, and connect a double-circuit, 230,000-volt (230-kV) electric transmission line across the U.S.-Mexico border in eastern San Diego County, California." The line would be 1.7 miles long, less than a mile of which will be in the U.S. The line would connect the Sunrise Powerlink to the Energía Sierra Juárez wind project near the town of La Rumorosa in northern Baja California. That project, owned by San Diego Gas and Electric's parent company Sempra, is slated to include an initial 52 wind turbines generating 156 megawatts of power for importation into the U.S.**¶** The transmission project has raised opposition due to its contribution to the increasing industrialization of San Diego County's backcountry, but most opposition to date has been focused on the wind project to which the power line connects. The 2009 application for the Energía Sierra Juárez project to Mexico's environmental ministry, Secretaria de Medio Ambiente y Recursos Naturales described a proposed 700,000-acre footprint with 1,000 wind turbines each producing 1.25 megawatts and more than 500 miles of roads running among them. The Sierra Juárez mountains are considered a "sky island" in the northern Baja desert, with thick conifer forests and a high level of biodiversity.

#### Chemical explosions don’t cause extinction

**WNA 2012**

(World Nuclear Association, “Safety of Nuclear Power Reactors”, March, <http://www.world-nuclear.org/info/inf06.html>, ldg)

In the 1950s attention turned to harnessing the power of the atom in a controlled way, as demonstrated at Chicago in 1942 and subsequently for military research, and applying the steady heat yield to generate electricity. This naturally gave rise to concerns about accidents and their possible effects. However, with nuclear power safety depends on much the same factors as in any comparable industry: intelligent planning, proper design with conservative margins and back-up systems, high-quality components and a well-developed safety culture in operations. A particular nuclear scenario was loss of cooling which resulted in melting of the nuclear reactor core, and this motivated studies on both the physical and chemical possibilities as well as the biological effects of any dispersed radioactivity. Those responsible for nuclear power technology in the West devoted extraordinary effort to ensuring that a meltdown of the reactor core would not take place, since it was assumed that a meltdown of the core would create a major public hazard, and if uncontained, a tragic accident with likely multiple fatalities. In avoiding such accidents the industry has been very successful. In over 14,500 cumulative reactor-years of commercial operation in 32 countries, there have been only three major accidents to nuclear power plants - Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, and Fukushima - the second being of little relevance to reactor design outside the old Soviet bloc. It was not until the late 1970s that detailed analyses and large-scale testing, followed by the 1979 meltdown of the Three Mile Island reactor, began to make clear that even the worst possible accident in a conventional western nuclear power plant or its fuel would not be likely to cause dramatic public harm. The industry still works hard to minimize the probability of a meltdown accident, but it is now clear that no-one need fear a potential public health catastrophe simply because a fuel meltdown happens. Fukushima has made that clear, with a triple meltdown causing no fatalities or serious radiation doses to anyone, while over two hundred people continued working on the site to mitigate the accident's effects. The decades-long test and analysis program showed that less radioactivity escapes from molten fuel than initially assumed, and that most of this radioactive material is not readily mobilized beyond the immediate internal structure. Thus, even if the containment structure that surrounds all modern nuclear plants were ruptured, as it has been with at least one of the Fukushima reactors, it is still very effective in preventing escape of most radioactivity. It is the laws of physics and the properties of materials that mitigate disaster, more than the required actions by safety equipment or personnel. In fact, licensing approval for new plants now requires that the effects of any core-melt accident must be confined to the plant itself, without the need to evacuate nearby residents. The three significant accidents in the 50-year history of civil nuclear power generation are: Three Mile Island (USA 1979) where the reactor was severely damaged but radiation was contained and there were no adverse health or environmental consequences Chernobyl (Ukraine 1986) where the destruction of the reactor by steam explosion and fire killed 31 people and had significant health and environmental consequences. The death toll has since increased to about 5 Fukushima (Japan 2011) where three old reactors (together with a fourth) were written off and the effects of loss of cooling due to a huge tsunami were inadequately contained. A table showing all reactor accidents, and a table listing some energy-related accidents with multiple fatalities are appended. These three significant accidents occurred during more than 14,000 reactor-years of civil operation. Of all the accidents and incidents, only the Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents resulted in radiation doses to the public greater than those resulting from the exposure to natural sources. The Fukushima accident resulted in some radiation exposure of workers at the plant, but not such as to threaten their health, unlike Chernobyl. Other incidents (and one 'accident') have been completely confined to the plant. Apart from Chernobyl, no nuclear workers or members of the public have ever died as a result of exposure to radiation due to a commercial nuclear reactor incident. Most of the serious radiological injuries and deaths that occur each year (2-4 deaths and many more exposures above regulatory limits) are the result of large uncontrolled radiation sources, such as abandoned medical or industrial equipment. (There have also been a number of accidents in experimental reactors and in one military plutonium-producing pile - at Windscale, UK, in 1957, but none of these resulted in loss of life outside the actual plant, or long-term environmental contamination.) See also Table 2 in Appendix.

#### Economic collapse doesn’t cause war

**Bazzi et al., UCSD economics department, 2011**

(Samuel, “Economic Shocks and Conflict: The (Absence of?) Evidence from Commodity Prices”, November, <http://www.chrisblattman.com/documents/research/2011.EconomicShocksAndConflict.pdf?9d7bd4>, ldg)

VI. Discussion and conclusions A. Implications for our theories of political instability and conflict The state is not a prize?—Warlord politics and the state prize logic lie at the center of the most influential models of conflict, state development, and political transitions in economics and political science. Yet we see no evidence for this idea in economic shocks, even when looking at the friendliest cases: fragile and unconstrained states dominated by extractive commodity revenues. Indeed, we see the opposite correlation: if anything, higher rents from commodity prices weakly 22 lower the risk and length of conflict. Perhaps shocks are the wrong test. Stocks of resources could matter more than price shocks (especially if shocks are transitory). But combined with emerging evidence that war onset is no more likely even with rapid increases in known oil reserves (Humphreys 2005; Cotet and Tsui 2010) we regard the state prize logic of war with skepticism.17 Our main political economy models may need a new engine. Naturally, an absence of evidence cannot be taken for evidence of absence. Many of our conflict onset and ending results include sizeable positive and negative effects.18 Even so, commodity price shocks are highly influential in income and should provide a rich source of identifiable variation in instability. It is difficult to find a better-measured, more abundant, and plausibly exogenous independent variable than price volatility. Moreover, other time-varying variables, like rainfall and foreign aid, exhibit robust correlations with conflict in spite of suffering similar empirical drawbacks and generally smaller sample sizes (Miguel et al. 2004; Nielsen et al. 2011). Thus we take the absence of evidence seriously. Do resource revenues drive state capacity?—State prize models assume that rising revenues raise the value of the capturing the state, but have ignored or downplayed the effect of revenues on self-defense. We saw that a growing empirical political science literature takes just such a revenue-centered approach, illustrating that resource boom times permit both payoffs and repression, and that stocks of lootable or extractive resources can bring political order and stability. This countervailing effect is most likely with transitory shocks, as current revenues are affected while long term value is not. Our findings are partly consistent with this state capacity effect. For example, conflict intensity is most sensitive to changes in the extractive commodities rather than the annual agricultural crops that affect household incomes more directly. The relationship only holds for conflict intensity, however, and is somewhat fragile. We do not see a large, consistent or robust decline in conflict or coup risk when prices fall. A reasonable interpretation is that the state prize and state capacity effects are either small or tend to cancel one another out. Opportunity cost: Victory by default?—Finally, the inverse relationship between prices and war intensity is consistent with opportunity cost accounts, but not exclusively so. As we noted above, the relationship between intensity and extractive commodity prices is more consistent with the state capacity view. Moreover, we shouldn’t mistake an inverse relation between individual aggression and incomes as evidence for the opportunity cost mechanism. The same correlation is consistent with psychological theories of stress and aggression (Berkowitz 1993) and sociological and political theories of relative deprivation and anomie (Merton 1938; Gurr 1971). Microempirical work will be needed to distinguish between these mechanisms. Other reasons for a null result.—Ultimately, however, the fact that commodity price shocks have no discernible effect on new conflict onsets, but some effect on ongoing conflict, suggests that political stability might be less sensitive to income or temporary shocks than generally believed. One possibility is that successfully mounting an insurgency is no easy task. It comes with considerable risk, costs, and coordination challenges. Another possibility is that the counterfactual is still conflict onset. In poor and fragile nations, income shocks of one type or another are ubiquitous. If a nation is so fragile that a change in prices could lead to war, then other shocks may trigger war even in the absence of a price shock. The same argument has been made in debunking the myth that price shocks led to fiscal collapse and low growth in developing nations in the 1980s.19 B. A general problem of publication bias? More generally, these findings should heighten our concern with publication bias in the conflict literature. Our results run against a number of published results on commodity shocks and conflict, mainly because of select samples, misspecification, and sensitivity to model assumptions, and, most importantly, alternative measures of instability. Across the social and hard sciences, there is a concern that the majority of published research findings are false (e.g. Gerber et al. 2001). Ioannidis (2005) demonstrates that a published finding is less likely to be true when there is a greater number and lesser pre-selection of tested relationships; there is greater flexibility in designs, definitions, outcomes, and models; and when more teams are involved in the chase of statistical significance. The cross-national study of conflict is an extreme case of all these. Most worryingly, almost no paper looks at alternative dependent variables or publishes systematic robustness checks. Hegre and Sambanis (2006) have shown that the majority of published conflict results are fragile, though they focus on timeinvariant regressors and not the time-varying shocks that have grown in popularity. We are also concerned there is a “file drawer problem” (Rosenthal 1979). Consider this decision rule: scholars that discover robust results that fit a theoretical intuition pursue the results; but if results are not robust the scholar (or referees) worry about problems with the data or empirical strategy, and identify additional work to be done. If further analysis produces a robust result, it is published. If not, back to the file drawer. In the aggregate, the consequences are dire: a lower threshold of evidence for initially significant results than ambiguous ones.20

### Advantage 2 clean tech

**Multiple alt cause – gun control and corruption**

**Bonner and Rozental 9** (Robert C., Former Commissioner – U.S. Customs and Border Protection; Former Administrator – Drug Enforcement Administration, and Andrѐs, Former Deputy Foreign Minister of Mexico; Former President and Founder – Mexican Council on Foreign Relations, “Managing the United States-Mexico Border: Cooperative Solutions to Common Problems,” Pacific Council on International Policy, http://www.pacificcouncil.org/admin/document.doc?id=31)

**Current laws and regulations in each country sometimes impede cooperation**. **U.S. gun laws allow individuals to purchase a range of firearms whose possession would be severely punished in Mexico**; some states have much laxer restrictions, and in the case of gun shows, sales are entirely unregulated. The end of the assault weapons ban in the United States has meant that much more dangerous weaponry can now be purchased easily in the United States, and differences in state laws drive controls to the low common denominator for smugglers. That said, U.S. officials currently possess considerable legal authority to prevent and disrupt arms trafficking, both by preventing straw purchases and interdicting southbound traffic. **A far more serious obstacle to cooperation is institutional weakness on the Mexican side**, **which shows up in lack of resources, poor professionalism, and corruption**. At present, Mexican customs officials inspect only 8% of traffic crossing the frontier; these inspections are conducted at random, and they are often cursory. Mexican Customs also lacks the technology that would allow them to interdict vehicles suspected of carrying contraband (e.g., license plate scanners), much less scan large numbers of vehicles in a short period of time. As a result, **it is basically impossible for Mexican officials to deter smuggling** of firearms, ammunition, and bulk cash into the country. **Low levels of professional training mean that that law enforcement agencies in Mexico cannot perform several functions essential to closer binational cooperation**. Both the police and the military do a poor job of collecting and synthesizing intelligence, conducting undercover operations, and investigating unprofessional conduct by their own personnel. **More frequent shifts of personnel also make it more difficult for individual officers on different sides of the border** (or even with Mexico itself) **to establish long-term working relationships, especially at the Mexican ports of entry**. **The most striking manifestation of institutional weakness on the Mexican side is corruption**. In some cases, **U.S. officials with information on major criminal figures have been reluctant to pass it on to their Mexican counterparts**; Mexican officials also often mistrust each other. **The problem of corruption requires deep structural change within the Mexican justice system and cannot be resolved simply through the infusion of new equipment or personnel**. Recent steps by the Mexican government to professionalize law enforcement agencies, arrest corrupt officials, reform the judicial system, and convert Mexican Customs into a full-fledged enforcement agency, however, all speak volumes about the government’s commitment to address this problem.

#### No impact to transmission diplomacy

**Buzan, London School of Economics IR professor, 2010**

(Barry, “The End of Leadership?—Constraints on the World Role of Obama’s America”, <http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/43579/1/Obama%20nation_the%20end%20of%20leadership%28lsero%29.pdf>, ldg)

INTRODUCTION It is appealing to think of the Obama administration as a return to normalcy after the deviance, unilateralist arrogance and damaging mistakes of the Bush years. In this view, we should expect a return to business as usual, with the US picking up the signature themes of multilateralism and the market that have underpinned its world role since the end of the Second World War. Although by no means universally loved, the US was an effective leader through the Cold War and beyond not only because it promoted liberal economic and political values that were attractive to many others, but also because it was prepared to bind its own power in multilateral rules and institutions sufficiently that its followers could contain their fear of its overwhelming power. Does Obama’s liberal stance mean that we should expect a return to the leadership role that the US has exercised for more than half a century? I argue that this is unlikely to happen because there are now three powerful constraints that will largely block a return to US leadership. The first is that the US has lost much of its followership. The second is that the capacity of the US to lead is now much weakened even if it still retains the will to do so. The third is that there is a general turn within international society against hegemony and therefore against the global leadership role itself. LOST FOLLOWERSHIP If the US remains willing to lead, will anyone follow? There are two issues here: the growing range of policy disagreements on specific issues between the US and others; and the decline of shared values and visions between the US and its former followers. A good symbol of the weakening relationship between the US and its followers is the replacement of talk about ‘friends and allies’ or ‘the free world’ with a much harsher and still basically unchanged, line about ‘coalitions of the willing’. There is some hope that under Obama differences over policy might improve in specific areas, particularly the environment, but even on that issue Obama will be lucky just to get the US seen as not part of the problem. Domestic constraints on carbon pricing and accepting binding international standards will make it difficult for the US to lead. Many other areas of disagreement remain, some deep. The US has failed to make the war on terrorism into anything like the binding cause that underpinned its leadership during the Cold War, and its policies continue to erode its liberal credentials. By its use of torture, and even moreso the public advocacy of such interrogation techniques by senior Bush administration figures, and by its rejection of the Geneva Conventions on prisoners or war, it exposed itself to ridicule and contempt as an advocate for human rights. That China is still plausibly able to criticise the US on human rights and environment issues is a marker of how far Washington’s reputation has fallen. US policy in the Middle East, particularly on Israel, has few followers, and the repercussions of the disastrous interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan continue to rattle on. Unless China turns quite nasty, the inclination of many in the US to see China as a challenger to its unipolar position is unlikely to attract much sympathy. The financial chaos of 2008-9 has undermined Washington’s credibility as an economic leader. Anti-Americanism, though obviously not newbecame exceptionally strong under Bush, and is now more culturally based, and more corrosive of shared identities. It questions whether the ‘American way of life’ is an appropriate model for the rest of the world, and whether the US economic model is either sustainable or desirable. It looks at health; at a seeming US inclination to use force as the first choice policy instrument, with its domestic parallel of gun culture; at the influence of religion and special interest lobbies in US domestic politics; at a US government which was openly comfortable with the use of torture and was re-elected; and at a federal environmental policy until recently in denial about global warming; and asks not just whether the US is a questionable model, but whether it has become a serious part of the problem. While some of this was specific to the Bush administration, and is being turned around by Obama, some of the deeper issues are more structural. The US is much more culturally conservative, religious, individualistic, and anti-state than most other parts of the West. America’s religion and cultural conservatism and anti-statism set it apart from most of Europe, where disappointment with Obama is already palpable. America’s individualism and anti-statism set it apart from Asia, where China is anyway disinclined to be a follower. This kind of anti-Americanism rests on very real differences, and raises the possibility that the idea of ‘the West’ was just a passing epiphenomenon of the Cold War. The Bush administration asset-stripped half-a-century of respect for, goodwill towards and trust in US leadership, and it reflected, and helped to consolidate, a shift in the centre of gravity of US politics. The Obama administration cannot just go back to the late 1990s and pick up from where Clinton left off. LOST CAPACITY In addition to having less common ground with its followers the US also has less capacity, both material and ideological, to play the role of leader. The rise of China, and also India, Brazil and others, means that the US now operates in a world in which the distribution of power is becoming more diffuse, and in which several centres of power are not closely linked to it, and some are opposed. In this context, the Bush legacy of a crashed economy and an enormous debt severely constrain the leadership options of the Obama administration. The economic crisis of 2008-9 not only hamstrung the US in terms of material capability, but also stripped away the Washington consensus as the ideological legitimizer for US leadership. The collapse of neoliberal ideology might yet be seen as an ideational event on the same scale as the collapse of communism in 1989. Since the late 1990s, and very sharply since 2003, the US has in many ways become the enemy of its own 20th century project and thus of its own capacity to lead. Not surprisingly this has deepened a longstanding disjuncture between how the US perceives itself and how the rest of the world sees it. The deeply established tendency of the US to see itself as an intrinsic force for good because it stands for a right set of universal values, makes it unable easily, or possibly at all, to address the disjuncture between its self-perception and how others see it. Self-righteous unilateralism does not acquire legitimacy abroad. To the extent that celebrations of US power as a good in itself (because the US is good) dominate American domestic politics, this does not inspire the US to seek grounds for legitimating its position abroad. A contributing factor here is the US tendency to demand nearly absolute security for itself. The problem for the US of transcending its own self-image is hardly new, but it has become both more difficult and more important in managing its position in the more complex world in which the US is neither so clearly on the right side of a great struggle, nor so dominant in material terms. It is unclear at this point whether Obama will be able to transcend this aspect of American politics, though it is clear that the nature of American politics makes it difficult for any president to do so. THE TURN AGAINST HEGEMONY The third constraint stems not from any particular characteristic of the US, but from the fact of unipolarity itself. Since decolonisation global international society has developed a growing disjuncture between a defining principle of legitimacy based on sovereign equality, and a practice that is substantially rooted in the hegemony of great powers. The problem is the absence of a consensual principle of hegemony with which international society might bridge this gap between its principles and its practices. A concentration of power in one actor disrupts the ideas of balance and equilibrium which are the traditional sources and conditions for legitimacy in international society. This problem would arise for any unipolar power, but it connects back to the more US-specific aspects of the legitimacy deficit. Under the Bush administration, the US lost sight of what Adam Watson calls raison de systeme (‘the belief that it pays to make the system work’), and this exacerbated the illegitimacy of hegemony in itself. Since the US looks unlikely to abandon its attachment to its own hegemony, this problem is not going to go away. If hegemony itself is illegitimate, and the US now lacks both the capabilities and attractiveness to overcome this, what lies on the near horizon is a world with no global leader. Such a world would still have several great powers influential within and beyond their regions: the EU, Russia, China, Japan, the US, possibly India and Brazil. It would also have many substantial regional powers such as South Africa, Turkey and Iran. Whether one sees a move towards a more polycentric, pluralist, and probably regionalised, world political order as desirable or worrying is a matter of choice. In such a world, global hegemony by any one power or culture will be unacceptable. Obama may hasten or delay the US exit from leadership. But the waning of the Western tide, and the re-emergence of a more multi-centred (in terms of power and wealth) and more multicultural (albeit with substantial elements of Westernization) world, mean that hegemonic global leadership whether by a single power or the West collectively is no longer going to be acceptable. The question is whether such a new world order can find the foundations for collective great power management, and whether the US can learn to live in a more pluralist international society where it is no longer the sole superpower but merely the first among equals. Pg. 4-6

**Energy coop high now**

**GNEB 11** – Good Neighbor Environmental Board, The Good Neighbor Environmental Board was created in 1992 by the Enterprise for the Americas ¶ Initiative Act, Public Law 102-532.The purpose of the Board is to “advise the President and the ¶ Congress on the need for implementation of environmental and infrastructure projects (including ¶ projects that affect agriculture, rural development, and human nutrition) within the States of the ¶ United States contiguous to Mexico in order to improve the quality of life of persons residing on ¶ the United States side of the border.” ¶ The Board is charged with submitting an annual report to the President and the Congress. ¶ Management responsibilities for the Board were delegated to the Administrator of the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency by Executive Order 12916 on May 13, 1994

(“The Potential Environmental and Economic Benefits of Renewable Energy Development in the U.S.-Mexico Border Region,” <http://www.epa.gov/ofacmo/gneb/gneb14threport/English-GNEB-14th-Report.pdf>)

**Despite** the challenges, **the United States and Mexico are working together on a wide variety of renewable energy and energy efficiency projects. The** U.S. Agency for International Development (**USAID) ¶ is working with Mexico to develop a national Low-Emission Development Strategy** (LEDS) **for Mexico ¶ and also is working with Mexican federal, state, and municipal governments on a range of programs, from ¶ encouraging the use of renewables to energy efficient mortgages and renewable standards**. ¶ In 2010, the United States and Mexico expanded their Methane to Markets Partnership with the ¶ launch of the Global Methane Initiative (GMI) to expand and accelerate global methane reductions. ¶ In addition, **EPA cooperates with the Mexican Secretariat of Environment and Natural Resources ¶ (SEMARNAT) on reducing heavy vehicle emissions through Mexico’s Transporte Limpio program, ¶ which is based on EPA’s SmartWay program, aimed at reducing transportation-related emissions by ¶ creating incentives to improve supply chain fuel efficiency. DOE and SENER share information on ¶ smart grid, renewable energy, and energy efficiency technologies, and work with EPA and SEMARNAT ¶ on a partnership to develop a program similar to ENERGY STAR to promote the use of more efficient ¶ building materials and appliances in Mexico**. Mexico has taken the lead within the Energy and Climate ¶ Partnership of the Americas on an Energy Efficiency Working Group for the region, and supports ¶ regional interconnections and energy access efforts. Mexico also is part of the Clean Energy Ministerial process, where it leads with other countries on energy efficiency, smart grid, and renewable energy ¶ initiatives. Finally, **as part of a 1993 bilateral agreement to the North American Free Trade Agreement ¶ (NAFTA), the United States and Mexico formed the North American Development Bank (NADB) ¶ and Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC), which recently have begun assessing and ¶ financing some renewable energy projects in the border area**.

#### No African war and it doesn’t escalate

**Straus, Wisconsin politics professor, 2012**

(Scott, “Wars Do End! Changing Patterns Of Political Violence In Sub-Saharan Africa”, afraf.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2012/03/01/afraf.ads015.full, ldg)

Domestic factors such as stronger civil societies, consistent economic growth, or stronger states are good candidates to explain the change. But following some recent work on global patterns of warfare,44 I emphasize geo-political shifts. These include a decline in external state support for insurgencies, the promotion of multi-party elections, significant investments in conflict prevention and mediation after the Cold War, and the rise of China. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union were major sources of funding for insurgencies and states fighting insurgencies. From the Horn of Africa to the southern states, the superpower rivalry meant that states and insurgencies had access to weaponry, training, ideological discipline, and diplomatic support. When the Cold War ended, some states that had received previous external support during the Cold War became newly vulnerable, such as Mengistu's Ethiopia, Siad Barre's Somalia, Mobutu Sese Seko's Zaire, and Liberia's Samuel Doe. By the same token, some rebel groups that had received funding through Cold War channels became weaker, such as UNITA in Angola. In other locations, the end of the Cold War created a new window of opportunity for armed opposition groups who had been waiting for the right moment to start their insurgencies, as in Rwanda and Mali. Thus, the first decade following the end of the Cold War saw an immediate increase in warfare, as belligerents saw new conditions and opportunities to start or settle conflicts. But thereafter the frequency of wars declined and their character changed. Beginning in the late 1990s, the external opportunities for insurgents to garner weaponry, training, advisory input, and ideological discipline became much more meagre. States such as Sudan supported insurgencies to disrupt their neighbours, as with the Lord's Resistance Army, but large-scale international support for insurgencies as structured fighting forces and governments in waiting sharply declined. New insurgencies started across the continent, and in places they survived because of access to mineral resources or because the states they fought were weak. But these insurgencies did not develop into the kinds of well-structured guerrilla armies that evolved during and just after the Cold War. A related change is the rise of multi-party electoral rules that followed the end of the Cold War. On balance, the opening of the electoral terrain, however flawed in some cases, attracted would-be insurgents away from the lure of the bush and toward the political arena. The onset of multi-party elections meant that, from a would-be insurgent's point of view, governments were at least nominally vulnerable outside the context of armed resistance. Moreover, the weight of international funding flowed toward sponsoring elections and civil society organizations. For talented opposition figures, the opening of the political arena – combined with the change in international funding streams – created a strong pull away from the battlefield toward the domestic political arena.

#### Afghan instability doesn’t escalate

Finel 9 [Dr. Bernard I. Finel, an Atlantic Council contributing editor, is a senior fellow at the American Security Project, “Afghanistan is Irrelevant,” Apr 27 http://www.acus.org/new\_atlanticist/afghanistan-irrelevant]

It is now a deeply entrenched conventional wisdom that the decision to “abandon” Afghanistan after the Cold War was a tragic mistake. In the oft-told story, our “abandonment” led to civil war, state collapse, the rise of the Taliban, and inevitably terrorist attacks on American soil. This narrative is now reinforced by dire warnings about the risks to Pakistan from instability in Afghanistan. Taken all together, critics of the Afghan commitment now find themselves facing a nearly unshakable consensus in continuing and deepen our involvement in Afghanistan. The problem with the consensus is that virtually every part of it is wrong. Abandonment did not cause the collapse of the state. Failed states are not always a threat to U.S. national security. And Pakistan’s problems have little to do with the situation across the border. First, the collapse of the Afghan state after the Soviet withdrawal had little to do with Western abandonment. Afghanistan has always been beset by powerful centrifugal forces. The country is poor, the terrain rough, the population divided into several ethnic groups. Because of this, the country has rarely been unified even nominally and has never really had a strong central government. The dominant historical political system in Afghan is warlordism. This is not a consequence of Western involvement or lack thereof. It is a function of geography, economics, and demography. Second, there is no straight-line between state failure and threats to the United States. Indeed, the problem with Afghanistan was not that it failed but rather that it “unfailed” and becameruled by the Taliban. Congo/Zaire is a failed state. Somalia is a failed state. There are many parts of the globe that are essentially ungoverned. Clearly criminality, human rights abuses, and other global ills flourish in these spaces. But the notion that any and all ungoverned space represents a core national security threat to the United States is simply unsustainable. Third, the problem was the Taliban regime was not that it existed. It was that it was allowed to fester without any significant response or intervention. We largely sought to ignore the regime — refusing to recognize it despite its control of 90% of Afghan territory. Aside from occasional tut-tutting about human rights violations and destruction of cultural sites, the only real interaction the United States sought with the regime was in trying to control drugs. Counter-drug initiatives are not a sound foundation for a productive relationship for reasons too numerous to enumerate here. Had we recognized the Taliban and sought to engage the regime, it is possible that we could have managed to communicate red lines to them over a period of years. Their failure to turn over bin Laden immediately after 9/11 does not necessarily imply an absolute inability to drive a wedge between the Taliban and al Qaeda over time. Fourth, we are now told that defeating the Taliban in Afghanistan is imperative in order to help stabilize Pakistan. But, most observers seem to think that Pakistan is in worse shape now — with the Taliban out of power and American forces in Afghanistan — than it was when the Taliban was dominant in Afghanistan. For five years from 1996 to 2001, the Taliban ruled Afghanistan and the Islamist threat to Pakistan then was unquestionably lower. This is not surprising actually. Insurgencies are at their most dangerous — in terms of threat of contagion — when they are fighting for power. The number of insurgencies that actually manage to sponsor insurgencies elsewhere after taking power is surprising low. The domino theory is as dubious in the case of Islamist movements as it was in the case of Communist expansion. There is a notion that “everything changed on 9/11.” We are backing away as a nation from that concept in the case of torture. Perhaps we should also come to realize that our pre-9/11 assessment of the strategic value and importance of Afghanistan was closer to the mark that our current obsession with it. We clearly made some mistakes in dealing with the Taliban regime. But addressing those mistakes through better intelligence, use of special forces raids, and, yes, diplomacy is likely a better solution than trying to build and sustain a reliable, pro-Western government in Kabul with control over the entire country.

### Advantage 3 Mexico

#### Robinson is just rhetoric and it’s way too old – squo nukes should solve the internal link

#### Arizona is planning CBT with Mexico in the squo, and now is not key

Evan Wyloge, 12/3/12 Reporter for the Arizona Governer’s Office of Energy Policy. “Arizona-Mexico Energy Panel Examines Cross-Border Transmission.” http://www.azenergy.gov/doclib/12-3-12\_AZ-Mexico\_energy\_panel\_examines\_cross-border\_transmission.pdf

Arizona is taking the first steps to explore a future where energy flows across the state’s southern border and creates a more integrated power grid that bolsters energy markets, strengthens the border region’s energy industry and responds to the abundant solar energy resources of the Southwest.¶ The bi-national Arizona-Mexico Commission Energy committee was established by Gov. Jan Brewer in May 2011 to research ways to increase energy efficiency, promote renewable energy and encourage the development of commercial energy entities to support those goals.¶ At one of the committee’s meetings this past June, Brewer and Gov. Guillermo Padres Elias of Sonora discussed how changes in Mexico’s energy laws could allow its state-operated utility to purchase energy from U.S. firms. That spurred a more focused force to look into cross-border transmission of electricity, particularly solar-generated electricity. During a Nov. 28 solar energy conference in Phoenix, Leisa Brug, energy policy adviser to Brewer and one of the committee co-chairs, outlined the direction the group will take.¶ “We’re kind of at a tipping point, where things have been freed up on the Mexico side of the border and we have the technology here,” Brug said. “Energy and the sun know know borders, so nor should we, when it comes to energy, especially when it benefits people on both sides of that man-made border.¶ Brug said it’s still early to be certain, but one of the main benefits of cross-border energy transmission could be lower costs for Mexican consumers, who now pay around three times the cost of electric energy in Arizona.¶ And with new solar projects being launched by Mexico, the transmission could come the other way at some point, too, Brug said.¶ “Today, if we had a transmission line, we could be in a position to sell much-needed energy to Mexico,” Brug said. “A few years in the future, we would lover for Sonora to be in a position to sell us energy.¶ Marty Shult, senior policy director for Brownstein Hyatt Farber Shcreck and former vice president of Pinnacle West Capital Corporation and Arizona public service, said an added benefit to a cross-border transmission line would be new projects for the much-slowed energy industry in Arizona.¶ Whereas growth in Arizona is not what it was before the economic downturn, and there won’t be much need for additional energy infrastructure for several years, a new market south of the U.S.-Mexico border could provide a boost for the industry.

#### Overconsumption and voltage instability are the primary causes of blackouts, not the power source itself

Damir Novosel is president and general manager for T&D Consulting at KEMA.  Miroslav M. Begovic is a member of the faculty of the School of Electrical and Computer Engineering at Georgia Institute of Technology, and Vahid **Madani** is a principal protection engineer at Pacific Gas and Electric Co. (PG&E).  2004 “Shedding Light on Blackouts” http:// [ieeexplore.ieee.org/iel5/8014/28253/01263414.pdf](http://ieeexplore.ieee.org/iel5/8014/28253/01263414.pdf)

In recent years, voltage instability has been one of the major reasons for blackouts, and it is the root cause of the 14 August blackout. A typical scenario in such cases is high system loading due to heavy transfers across the grid, followed by the events that initiate relaying actions (a fault, line overload, or generator reaching its excitation limit). As the grid becomes more overloaded, more reactive power is consumed, causing voltages to drop. It is desirable to provide enough reactive power close to the load. However, regardless of the provisions for reactive power support, the power system can experience “the point of no return” where voltage can no longer be maintained. As shown in Figure 2, there is a limit to power that can be transferred and the voltage at which it can be done. That limit depends on the power factor of the load and/or reactive support, available locally or remotely. If the load continues to grow to the critical value (point of voltage collapse), as shown in the Figure 2(a), voltages will collapse precipitously [Figure 2(b)]. In summary, there are three mechanisms to reach the point of voltage collapse: continuous load growth that brings the system to the “knee point,” a generator that reaches the reactive limit and the PV curve shifts so that the “knee point” is reached, and a contingency (e.g., line outage) that causes the “knee point” to shift to a lower critical load value than the value before the contingency. Voltage instability can cause the entire grid to experience precipitous voltage drop, unless action is taken to mitigate the condition. Such actions may include switching of shunt capacitors, SVCs and other means of reactive power support, blocking tap changers, exhausting reactive generation resources, and, as a last line of defense, shedding load (e.g., on under-voltage). However, as more and more reactive compensation is being added to the system (distribution and transmission), serious consideration needs to be given to possible prolonged exposure of equipment to higher voltages. Some utilities reported voltages well in excess of the nominal system voltage during light loading periods. Equipment operating at voltages in excess of their rating causes additional stress on the system.

#### Terrorists can’t sustain the operational focus necessary for WMD use

**Mueller et al., OSU political science professor, 2012**

(John, “The Terrorism Delusion”, International Security, 37.1, politicalscience.osu.edu/faculty/jmueller//absisfin.pdf, ldg)

In 2009, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a lengthy report on protecting the homeland. Key to achieving such an objective should be a careful assessment of the character, capacities, and desires of potential terrorists targeting that homeland. Although the report contains a section dealing with what its authors call “the nature of the terrorist adversary,” the section devotes only two sentences to assessing that nature: “The number and high profile of international and domestic terrorist attacks and disrupted plots during the last two decades underscore the determination and persistence of terrorist organizations. Terrorists have proven to be relentless, patient, opportunistic, and flexible, learning from experience and modifying tactics and targets to exploit perceived vulnerabilities and avoid observed strengths.”8 This description may apply to some terrorists somewhere, including at least a few of those involved in the September 11 attacks. Yet, it scarcely describes the vast majority of those individuals picked up on terrorism charges in the United States since those attacks. The inability of the DHS to consider this fact even parenthetically in its fleeting discussion is not only amazing but perhaps delusional in its single-minded preoccupation with the extreme. In sharp contrast, the authors of the case studies, with remarkably few exceptions, describe their subjects with such words as incompetent, ineffective, unintelligent, idiotic, ignorant, inadequate, unorganized, misguided, muddled, amateurish, dopey, unrealistic, moronic, irrational, and foolish.9 And in nearly all of the cases where an operative from the police or from the Federal Bureau of Investigation was at work (almost half of the total), the most appropriate descriptor would be “gullible.” In all, as Shikha Dalmia has put it, would-be terrorists need to be “radicalized enough to die for their cause; Westernized enough to move around without raising red flags; ingenious enough to exploit loopholes in the security apparatus; meticulous enough to attend to the myriad logistical details that could torpedo the operation; self-sufficient enough to make all the preparations without enlisting outsiders who might give them away; disciplined enough to maintain complete secrecy; and—above all—psychologically tough enough to keep functioning at a high level without cracking in the face of their own impending death.”10 The case studies examined in this article certainly do not abound with people with such characteristics. In the eleven years since the September 11 attacks, no terrorist has been able to detonate even a primitive bomb in the United States, and except for the four explosions in the London transportation system in 2005, neither has any in the United Kingdom. Indeed, the only method by which Islamist terrorists have managed to kill anyone in the United States since September 11 has been with gunfire—inflicting a total of perhaps sixteen deaths over the period (cases 4, 26, 32).11 This limited capacity is impressive because, at one time, small-scale terrorists in the United States were quite successful in setting off bombs. Noting that the scale of the September 11 attacks has “tended to obliterate America’s memory of pre-9/11 terrorism,” Brian Jenkins reminds us (and we clearly do need reminding) that the 1970s witnessed sixty to seventy terrorist incidents, mostly bombings, on U.S. soil every year.12 The situation seems scarcely different in Europe and other Western locales. Michael Kenney, who has interviewed dozens of government officials and intelligence agents and analyzed court documents, has found that, in sharp contrast with the boilerplate characterizations favored by the DHS and with the imperatives listed by Dalmia, Islamist militants in those locations are operationally unsophisticated, short on know-how, prone to making mistakes, poor at planning, and limited in their capacity to learn.13 Another study documents the difficulties of network coordination that continually threaten the terrorists’ operational unity, trust, cohesion, and ability to act collectively.14 In addition, although some of the plotters in the cases targeting the United States harbored visions of toppling large buildings, destroying airports, setting off dirty bombs, or bringing down the Brooklyn Bridge (cases 2, 8, 12, 19, 23, 30, 42), all were nothing more than wild fantasies, far beyond the plotters’ capacities however much they may have been encouraged in some instances by FBI operatives. Indeed, in many of the cases, target selection is effectively a random process, lacking guile and careful planning. Often, it seems, targets have been chosen almost capriciously and simply for their convenience. For example, a would-be bomber targeted a mall in Rockford, Illinois, because it was nearby (case 21). Terrorist plotters in Los Angeles in 2005 drew up a list of targets that were all within a 20-mile radius of their shared apartment, some of which did not even exist (case 15). In Norway, a neo-Nazi terrorist on his way to bomb a synagogue took a tram going the wrong way and dynamited a mosque instead.15

#### No WMD terrorism-no expertise, storage or delivery capacity.

**Mauroni, Air Force senior policy analyst, 2012**

(Al, “Nuclear Terrorism: Are We Prepared?”, Homeland Security Affairs, <http://www.hsaj.org/?fullarticle=8.1.9>, ldg)

Military chemical/biological (CB) warfare agents, radiological material, and nuclear weapons are not easily obtained, outside of government laboratories. Nation states invest large amounts of people and funds to develop and test specific unconventional weapons, and if they were to give or sell these weapons to terrorists, one of two things could happen — either the weapons would be traced back to them, or the weapons might be used someplace where the nation-state really didn’t want those weapons used. In theory, scientists recruited by sub-state groups could develop small quantities of military CB warfare agents, but the lack of access to fissile material would frustrate any ambitious engineer trying to build an improvised nuclear device. There are other hypotheses as to why sub-state groups have been unable to obtain nuclear weapons and/or fissile material on the “global market.” It could be that, despite the available information about nuclear weapons, these groups haven’t developed the expertise, skills, or experience to design a nuclear weapon. It takes time, resources, and a secure facility to successfully develop such a weapon, and international efforts to combat terrorism may have been successful in stopping such efforts. It could be that the scientists and engineers who are attracted to sub-state groups are not capable of designing weapons. It is a particularly challenging task to take a particularly hazardous material, developed in a laboratory, and turn it into a reliable military weapon of mass destruction. Last, it could be that sub-state groups have been frustrated by the numerous black-market scams and intelligence sting operations, in which fraudulent persons claimed to have nuclear material.9 Sub-state groups are interested in chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) hazards, however, because senior political leaders and military leaders publicly state, over and over again, how dangerous a release of these materials would be to the American public. So of course terrorists are interested in CBRN hazards, but they don’t have the expertise to produce the specialized military warfare agents, they don’t have any training in handling or storing them, and they don’t understand how to deliver the agents to their targets with any degree of effectiveness. So one might see some attempts to steal chlorine gas cylinders from water treatment sites, some occasional attempts to produce ricin toxin from castor beans, stories about a few grams of radioactive material stolen from a facility — these are not materials that cause mass casualty events. But the fear persists, and so government leaders spend billions every year to reduce the already minute possibility that some sub-state group does develop or steal a nuclear weapon for the purposes of employing it against the United States. This leads to our public policy discussion: to understand how effectively the USG is performing in this case.

#### No Russia war-no motive or capability

**Betts, Columbia war and peace studies professor, 2013**

(Richard, “The Lost Logic of Deterrence”, Foreign Affairs, March/April, ebsco, ldg)

These continuities with the Cold War would make sense only between intense adversaries. Washington and Moscow remain in an adversarial relationship, but not an intense one. If the Cold War is really over, and the West really won, then continuing implicit deterrence does less to protect against a negligible threat from Russia than to feed suspicions that aggravate political friction. In contrast to during the Cold War, it is now hard to make the case that Russia is more a threat to NATO than the reverse. First, the East-West balance of military capabilities, which at the height of the Cold War was favorable to the Warsaw Pact or at best even, has not only shifted to NATO's advantage; it has become utterly lopsided. Russia is now a lonely fraction of what the old Warsaw Pact was. It not only lost its old eastern European allies; those allies are now arrayed on the other side, as members of NATO. By every significant measure of power -- military spending, men under arms, population, economic strength, control of territory -- NATO enjoys massive advantages over Russia. The only capability that keeps Russia militarily potent is its nuclear arsenal. There is no plausible way, however, that Moscow's nuclear weapons could be used for aggression, except as a backstop for a conventional offensive -- for which NATO's capabilities are now far greater. Russia's intentions constitute no more of a threat than its capabilities. Although Moscow's ruling elites push distasteful policies, there is no plausible way they could think a military attack on the West would serve their interests. During the twentieth century, there were intense territorial conflicts between the two sides and a titanic struggle between them over whose ideology would dominate the world. Vladimir Putin's Russia is authoritarian, but unlike the Soviet Union, it is not the vanguard of a globe-spanning revolutionary ideal.